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ARTICLE

Compensation for Environmental Damage
in China: Theory and Practice
MICHAEL G. FAURE & LIU JING

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many observers have pointed to the fact that the spectacular
economic growth in China has come at a high price, especially
concerning the environmental costs related to this growth.1
There is increasing literature, both inside and outside of China,
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Research Center for Law of Economics of the China University of Political
Science and Law (CUPL). He is grateful to the China Ministry of Education and
to the Research Center for Law and Economics of CUPL for their support.
Email: michael.faure@maastrichtuniversity.nl.

Liu Jing is a postdotoral researcher at Wuhan University, China and a
guest researcher at Maastricht University, the Netherlands.
Email:
jing.liu@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
1. Chinese authorities estimated the costs of environmental degradation to
be 12745.7 billion Renminbi (RMB) in 2008, which would represent 3.9% of the
gross domestic product (GDP); the imputed costs of soil cleanup would reach
540.31 billion RMB. See [China Has Until 2008 to Complete the Environmental
and Economic Accounting Research Report], CHINESE ACADEMY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL
PLANNING
(Dec.
25,
2010),
http://www.caep.org.cn/
ReadNews.asp?NewsID=2761 (China). Earlier reports from the World Bank on
the amount of pollution costs in China in terms of GDP were also quite
alarming. They indicated that environmental damage costs were 8% of the total
GDP in China. See THE WORLD BANK, CHINA 2020 CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES:
CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY 23 (1997), available at
siteresources.worldbank.org/inteapregtopenvironment/Resources/Clear_Water_
Blue_Skies.pdf.
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on tools available to China to fight against pollution.2 Indeed,
with growing economic welfare, the demand for environmental
quality is increasing in China as well.3
The aim of our study is not so much to look at instruments
aiming at the prevention of environmental harm, but to address
the extent victims of environmental harm can be compensated in
China. The concept of “victims” should be interpreted broadly to
include both human victims and damage to the environment.
When the environment itself is the victim, questions arise
regarding the right of the government or a non-governmental
organization (NGO) to ask for remedies on behalf of the
environment. The goal of our study is not only to provide an
insight into the “law on the books” by describing which
instruments and remedies are available, but also to address “law
in action,” by examining the extent to which various
compensation mechanisms are indeed applied in practice. We
have undertaken interviews with stakeholders in China to obtain
information on the way in which environmental damage is
remedied.
Our focus is on remedies for environmental harm. Even
though the traditional remedy for damages resulting from
environmental pollution is monetary compensation, other
remedies, such as restitution, may be relevant as well. We will
address both available remedies on the basis of the regulatory
framework, and examine the extent to which these remedies are
applied. In addition, we will formulate suggestions for reform
where appropriate.
The issue of appropriate compensation for environmental
damage has become a hot topic in China.4 One can often hear

2. See generally NEIL CARTER & ARTHUR P.J. MOL, ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2007); CHEN GANG, POLITICS OF CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS (2009); XIAOYING MA & LEONARD
ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, ENFORCEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE (2000); Arthur P.J. Mol & Neil T. Carter, China’s
Environmental Governance in Transition, 15 ENVTL. POL. 149 (2006); Lan Xue et
al., Environmental Governance for China: Major Recommendations of a Task
Force, 16 ENVTL. POL. 669 (2007).
3. See generally GUO X. & D. MARINOVA, ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS IN
CHINA: FACILITATING THE GREENING OF THE ECONOMY (2011), available at
http://www.mssanz.org.au/modsim2011/D12/guo.pdf.
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about cases of environmental harm confronting the Chinese
people and their environment, whereby the question of
appropriate compensation often arises.5 This issue is typical,
given recent legislative changes in China. In December 2009,
China adopted a new Tort Liability Law (TLL).6 This law
integrated some important principles concerning environmental
liability.7 In addition, sector-based laws and regulations—in
some cases equally aimed at environmental liability—have
recently been published or are under consideration for adoption.8
Even though environmental insurance markets are not yet that
well developed in China, environmental insurance products are
becoming increasingly available on the Chinese market.9 Some of
these insurance products are strongly promoted by the
government and aim at compensating environmental harm.10
Strikingly, the only domain in which compensation seems to work
better—not only on paper, but also in practice—is cases involving
marine oil pollution in which international conventions have
played an important role.11 We will use the economic analysis of
the law to look at the effectiveness of the compensation for
environmental damage in China. Moreover, we will compare
compensation instruments issued either in the United States or
in Europe with the situation in China in order to provide a
comparative perspective.

4. Adam Moser & Tseming Yang, Environmental Tort Litigation in China,
41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10895, 10895-96 (2011).
5. Id.
6. See [Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1,
2010) [hereinafter TLL], available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/
201001/t20100110_300173.html (China).
7. These principles include: strict liability, reversed burden of proof,
proportional liability, and the determination of liability when third party
activities are involved. See Mo Zhang, Tort Liabilities and Torts Law: The New
Frontier of Chinese Legal Horizon, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 415, 486-89
(2011), available at http://rjglb.richmond.edu/index.php/tort-liabilities-and-tortslaw-the-new-frontier-of-chinese-legal-horizon/.
8. See infra part II.A.a.
9. See infra part III.B.b.
10. Id.
11. See infra part IV.
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This article is organized as follows: following the introduction
in Part I, Part II focuses on the role of liability rules in
compensation for environmental harm, then Part III focuses on
insurance, and Part IV discusses the specific case of marine oil
pollution. For each topic, we will first describe theoretical
possibilities for providing compensation, and then examine the
role these mechanisms play in practice. Part V offers a few
concluding remarks, and provides an economic analysis and
policy recommendations.
II. LIABILITY RULES
A. Theory: Environmental Liability in the Past and the
Present
a.

Introduction

Since quite a few publications have already explored the
issue of environmental liability in China,12 we will be relatively
brief in discussing theoretical possibilities for victims of
environmental pollution to obtain compensation for the
environmental damage they suffered.
The most important
question is how these theoretical possibilities are implemented in
practice.13 In this part, we discuss two types of environmental
damage that can be caused by accidents or gradual accumulation:
(1) traditional damage (such as personal injury and property
damage); and (2) ecological damage (environmental damage per
se). Such a distinction is relevant because, for the latter,

12. Some literature discusses environmental liability under the background
of the newly published Tort Liability Law. See generally Michael Faure & Hu
Weiqiang, Towards a Reform of Environmental Liability in China: An Economic
Analysis, 13 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 225 (2011); Zhang, supra note 7, at 486.
While other literature discusses the topic from the perspective of environmental
litigation and environmental dispute resolution. See Moser & Yang, supra note
4, at 10896. See generally Yuhong Zhao, Environmental Dispute Resolution in
China, 16 J. ENVTL. L. 157 (2004); RACHEL E. STERN, Navigating the Boundaries
of Political Tolerance: Environmental Litigation in China (Fall 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), available at
http://www.icassecretariat.org/files/R%20Stern_Navigating%20the%
20Boundaries_Ph.D.%20Diss%20(2009)_Double%20Spaced.pdf.
13. See infra part II.B.
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restoration is usually more important than just monetary
compensation. The necessity of government involvement makes
China’s compensation regime a combined civil and administrative
system.
These characteristics make traditional tort law
insufficient to compensate for ecological damage.14
Traditionally
there
were
possibilities
to
address
environmental damage via private law, but the rules were not
always clear or consistent.15 Rules concerning environmental
liability were contained in the so-called General Principles of
Civil Law of 1986 (GPCL),16 as well as in environmental statutes
covering specific fields. The Environmental Protection Law (EPL)
of 198917 is the basic statute in the field of environmental law in
China. In addition to this basic statute, some other sector-based
environmental statutes also have some environmental liability
provisions. These special environmental statutes include, for
example, the Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL) of
1982, 1999,18 the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law
(WPPL) of 1984, 2008,19 and the Solid Wastes Pollution
Prevention and Control Law (SWPPL) of 1995.20 The difficulty

14. Michael G. Faure & Liu Jing, New Models for the Compensation of
Natural Resources Damage, 4 KY. J. EQUINE AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCE L. 261,
269-73 (2012) (discussing the unique characteristics of ecological damage).
15. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, Limits of the Law in Addressing
China’s Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 125, 127 (1997).
16. [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987)
[hereinafter
GPCL],
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/
LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21898337.htm (China).
17. [Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989,
effective Dec. 26, 1989) [hereinafter EPL], available at http://www.china.org.cn/
english/environment/34356.htm (China).
18. [Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982,
revised Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000) [hereinafter MEPL], available at
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/mlrenglish/laws/200710/t20071012_656329.htm (China).
19. [Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 11,
1984, revised Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 1, 2008) [hereinafter WPPL],
available at faole .fao.org docs te ts chn23 9.doc (China).
20. [Solid Wastes Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
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lay in the fact that the conditions for liability differed between
the GPCL and the specialized statutes.21
Article 124 of the GPCL stipulates that: “Any person who
pollutes the environment and causes damages to others in
violation of State provisions for environmental protection and the
prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance with
the law.”22 A violation of a relevant regulation is a condition for
liability.23 The specialized laws, however, do not require a
violation of a specific regulation for liability.24 For example, the
EPL states in Section 1 of Article 41 that: “A unit that has caused
an environmental pollution hazard shall have the obligation to
eliminate it and make compensation to the unit or individual that
suffered direct losses.”25 Hence, the latter seems to introduce the
possibility of liability without violating any regulation,
introducing a strict liability rule.26
In Chinese legal scholarship, as well as in case law,
differences of opinion exist as to: (1) whether the GPCL or the
specialized statutes have priority, and (2) how to interpret the
requirement that a relevant law must be violated.27 These
debates have to an important extent been eliminated since China
introduced the TLL,28 which was passed on December 26, 2009.
Chapter VIII of the TLL contains rules on environmental liability
and opts for a strict liability regime, which would eliminate the
legal debate that took place in the past.29 Although the change
brought about by the TLL seems quite important from an
outsider’s perspective, experts assert that the introduction of
environmental liability in the TLL is less important than one may

Oct. 30, 1995, revised Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) [hereinafter
SWPPL], available at faole .fao.org docs te ts chn 331 .doc (China).
21. As discussed infra, the GPCL requires the violation of a legal obligation
to establish liability. While in these acts, the liability rules are similar to that
under the EPL, the violation is not a necessary requirement.
22. GPCL, art. 124.
23. Id.
24. See MEPL, art. 90; WPPL, art. 85; SWPPL, art. 84.
25. EPL, art. 41.
26. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 231-32.
27. Id. at 231-33.
28. TLL, art. 70.
29. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 235-36.
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think.30 Commentators have explained that the new provisions
are merely a summary of existing rules and in fact contain no
significant changes.31 Laws like the EPL already contained a
strict liability rule, so the new rule in the TLL is less than
revolutionary.32 Moreover, the change in material rules with
respect to environmental liability may not be that important
since the practical limits in obtaining compensation via liability
rules may be far more serious than the impediments in
legislation.33 As far as ecological damage is concerned, there are
still questions concerning the applicable liability rule.34 For
example, it is unclear whether the environmental liability rules
in the civil law mentioned above also cover ecological damage.
The TLL may broaden the scope of liability for environmental
harms.35 In the second official discussion draft on December 21,
2008, Article 67 stipulated: “If environmental pollution causes
harm to another, the polluter shall bear tort liability, but if other
laws specify defenses, then the other laws shall govern.”36

30. Interview with Wang Canfa, Professor, China University of Political
Science and Law, Centre for Legal Aid to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), in Beijing,
China (Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa] (on file
with authors).
31. Id. See Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897-98 (discussing the linkage
between the TLL and existing legislation); see also Zhang, supra note 7, at 48689.
32. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
33. See Surya Deva, The PRC Tort Law: A Big Step Forward?, 2 CITY U. H.K.
L. REV. 383, 394-95 (2010) (showing the impact of enforcement on the practical
effects of the new TLL).
34. As discussed infra, ecological damage is not discussed in other
environmental statutes, with the exception of the MEPL.
35. The general tort liability provision under the GPCL stipulates: “Citizens
and legal persons who through their fault encroach upon the State or collective
property or the property or the property or person of other people shall bear civil
liability. Civil liability shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law
so stipulates.” GPCL, art. 106. Under the GPCL, only when an act involves
damage to property or persons can liability be established. The TLL, as
discussed infra defines “civil rights and interests” broadly, by using a catchall
provision.
36. See generally [Tort Liability Law of People’s Republic of China (2d
Official Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 2008)], (George W. Conk & Wang Zhu, trans.,
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1501302 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1501302.
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Under this provision, liability is limited to harm to people,
but impairment to the environment was not included.37 The final
text adopted a broader definition by referring to “any harm,” and
the prerequisite of “damage to another” is no longer mentioned.38
This change may be read as expanding the scope of liability to
both harm to people and harm to the environment. However, this
provision needs to be explained in line with the rest of the
statute, including the general provision about the statute’s goals
(Article 1) and overall scope (Article 2). Article 1 states that the
aim of this law is “to protect the legitimate rights and interests of
parties in civil law relationships.”39 Article 2 further clarifies
that this law applies to the infringement upon “civil rights and
interests.”40 It holds:
Those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be
subject to the tort liability according to this Law. The term “civil
rights and interests” used in this act includes the right to life, the
right to health, the right to name, the right to reputation, the
right to honor, right to self image, right of privacy, marital
autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, security interest,
copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a trademark, right
of discovery, equities, right of succession, and other personal and
property rights and interests.41

The term “civil rights and interests” is determined by listing
specific rights and interests.42 The catchall expression also
enables an interest to receive protection under the TLL, even if it
is not established as a “civil right” and not explicitly included in
the list.43 However, these provisions provide no clear guidance on
37. See generally id.
38. TLL, art. 6 (“Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the
polluter shall assume the tort liability.”).
39. TLL, art. 1 (“In order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of
parties in civil law relationships, clarify the tort liability, prevent and punish
tortious conduct, and promote the social harmony and stability, this Law is
formulated.”).
40. TLL, art. 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of
Pure Economic Loss: Reflections on the Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN
ST. L. REV. 105, 114-15 (2011).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3
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whether liability can be established if there are no personal losses
involved. In other words, it is not clear whether liability can be
established for pure ecological damage or damage to natural
resources. Hence, to determine the extent that ecological damage
needs to be restored and compensated, one still needs to look at
specific environmental statutes. The only law that explicitly
mentions ecological damage as a compensable tort is within the
MEPL, concerning the release of oil into the marine
environment.44
b.

Basis of Liability

Until the promulgation of the TLL in December 2009, the
basis of environmental liability could generally be found in
Article 124 of the GPCL and in environmental protection statutes
covering specialized fields.45 These have not been formally
abrogated, but it is likely that in practice they may play a minor
role in the future, since victims will likely rely on the TLL.46
Chapter VIII of the TLL deals explicitly with environmental
liability.47 Article 65 of the TLL unconditionally provides that
the polluter shall be held liable for the harm caused by his
pollution.48 The language in Article 65 strongly suggests that a
strict liability rule applies.49 In contrast to Article 124 of the
GPCL, Article 65 of the TLL does not mention any requirement of
violation of relevant laws. In that respect, Article 65 of the TLL

44. See infra part IV.A.a.
45. See supra part II.A.a.
46. According to Article 83 of the Legislation Law: “With regard to laws,
administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate
regulations or rules, if they are formulated by one and the same organ and if
there is inconsistency between special provisions and general provisions, the
special provisions shall prevail; if [an] inconsistency between the new provisions
and the old provisions, the new provisions shall prevail.” [Legislation Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) [hereinafter Legislation
Law], available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207419.htm
(China).
47. TLL, art. 65-68.
48. Id. art. 6 (“Where any harm is caused by environmental pollution, the
polluter shall assume the tort liability.”).
49. Zhang, supra note 7, at 486-87.
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resembles the approach followed in the EPL of 1989.50
Consequently, a violation of relevant laws is no longer a condition
for liability, and neither is compliance with a regulation
mentioned as a specific defense.51 Exemptions to tort liability are
enumerated in a seemingly limited way in Chapter III of the
TLL.52 For example, under the TLL, when the injured party
shares responsibility for his injuries, the liability of the tortfeasor
may be mitigated, but if the injured party intentionally injures
himself, the tortfeasor will not be held liable.53 Liability is also
exonerated when the harm is caused by force majeure.54
The TLL provides the new legal basis for environmental
liability in China. What remains to be clarified is how the TLL
As
relates to existing specific environmental statutes.55
discussed supra, there are liability provisions in some
environmental statutes dealing with specific environmental
components, such as the MEPL, the WPPL, and the Atmospheric
Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPL).56
However, China does not have specific rules on liability for
soil pollution.57 Applying the general environmental liability
rules to soil pollution creates some practical difficulties. Given
the long-term characteristics of soil pollution, polluters are
difficult to identify and may cease to exist before the
manifestations of the pollution become apparent. The cleanup
50. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 235.
51. Id. at 235-37.
52. Id. at 237.
53. TLL, art. 27 (“The actor shall not be liable for any harm that is caused
intentionally by the victim.”).
54. TLL, art. 26 (“Where the victim of a tort is also at fault as to the
occurrence of harm, the liability of the tortfeasor may be mitigated.”); see also
id., art. 27; id., art. 29 (“Where any harm to another person is caused by a force
majeure, the tortfeasor shall not be liable, except as otherwise provided for by
law.”).
55. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 237.
56. [Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Sept. 5, 1987, effective June 1, 1988, revised Apr. 29, 2000, effective Sept. 1,
2000) [hereinafter APPL], available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/07/
content_29877.htm (China).
57. See ZHAO XIAOBO, DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE CONTAMINATED LAND
REGIME IN CHINA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE US AND THE UK 65-67 (2013)
(discussing the liability regime for soil pollution).
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and compensation for soil pollution are now subject to a variety of
different, rather piecemeal types of stipulations.58 For example,
the SWPPL provides in Article 35 that the entities discharging
industrial solid wastes need to take preventative measures at
sites before terminating their activities.59 In response, the
Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) (formerly, the
Environmental Protection Agency) has issued guidance
documents on the prevention of and liability for soil pollution.60
The guidance documents which describe strengthening pollution
prevention requirements during the relocation of industrial sites,
and the opinion on strengthening soil pollution prevention
requirements each provide guidance on the allocation of the soil
pollution liability.61 The Huanban 2004 Document stipulates
that producers of dangerous waste must assess the risk before
relocation to a new industrial site, and places the burden of
cleaning up contamination on the polluters.62 Likewise, the
Huanfa 2008 Document is based on the polluter-pays principle,
and holds the former operators as the primarily liable parties.63
When polluters have already ceased to exist, or cannot be
identified, the government or the transferee of the land shall take
remediation measures.64 However, these documents are still too

58. See id.
59. SWPPL, art. 3 (“Where it is necessary for the entities discharging
industrial solid wastes to be terminated, measures for preventing and
controlling pollution shall be taken in advance to the facilities and sites for
storing and treating industrial solid wastes, and the untreated industrial solid
wastes shall be disposed properly to prevent environmental pollution.”).
60. See ZHAO, supra note 57, at 65-67.
61. MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., [NOTICE OF GREAT JOB ON CORPORATE
RELOCATION PROCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL]
(June 1, 2004) [hereinafter HUANBAN 2004 DOCUMENT], available at
http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/zj/bgt/200910/ t20091022_173879.htm (China);
MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., [OPINIONS ON STRENGTHENING SOIL POLLUTION
PREVENTION AND CONTROL WORK] (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter HUANFA 2008
DOCUMENT],
available
at
http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/200910/
t20091022_174598.htm (China).
62. HUANBAN 2004 DOCUMENT, art. 1.
63. HUANFA 2008 DOCUMENT, pt. 8.
64. Id.
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abstract to solve many problems in practice.65 There are also
several drafts intended to provide more detailed technical
guidance on the assessment, monitoring, and management of
polluted sites,66 but these drafts have not entered into force yet.
In addition to those guidance documents, some local authorities
have made efforts to issue their own requirements for prevention
and remediation of soil pollution, such as Shengyang, and
These municipal requirements have many
Chongqing.67
similarities to the national guidance documents.68

65. For example, it does not answer the questions of who should be liable if
damage still emerges after the restoration, and how to allocate the liability
between existing and former operators.
66. See generally [CHINA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS:
GUIDELINES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT OF CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by
the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/bgw/
bbgth/200910/W020091009550671751947.pdf (China); [CHINA’S NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR SOIL REMEDIATION OF
CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available
at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/200912/W020091223374051865851.pdf
(China); [CHINA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: TECHNICAL
GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING OF SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by the
Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/
201002/W020100208572809009978.pdf
(China);
[CHINA’S
NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE INVESTIGATION (DRAFT)] (issued by the Ministry of Envtl.
Prot.), available at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/info/bgw/bbgth/200908/t20090812_
157381.htm (China), click link [THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE INVESTIGATION (DRAFT)]; [TEMPORARY SOIL MANAGEMENT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING OF CONTAMINATED SITES (DRAFT)] (issued by
the Ministry of Envtl. Prot.), available at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/
bgth/200912/W020091223431801518384.pdf (China).
67. For example, in Shenyang, a regulation on contaminated sites
remediation and restoration was promulgated in 2008.
See [Shenyang
Hazardous Waste Pollution Prevention Regulations] (promulgated by the
Shenyang City People’s Cong., Oct. 30, 2008, effective Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter
SHENYANG REGULATION ON PREVENTING POLLUTION FROM DANGEROUS WASTE],
available
at
http://www.ln.gov.cn/zfxx/fggz/gwyfg_3/sy/200902/t20090204_
330763.html (China). The Chongqing government also issued a document on
soil pollution restoration. CHONGQING ENVTL. PROT. BUREAU, [NOTICE ON
PROMOTING THE RESTORATION AT CONTAMINATED INDUSTRIAL SITES IN CHONGQING]
(May 27, 2013) [hereinafter CHONGQING RESTORATION OF CONTAMINATED SITES
REGULATIONS], available at http://www.cq.gov.cn/publicinfo/web/views/Show!
detail.action?sid=1106243 (China).
68. See generally SHENYANG REGULATION ON PREVENTING POLLUTION FROM
DANGEROUS WASTE, supra note 67; CHONGQING RESTORATION OF CONTAMINATED
SITES REGULATIONS, supra note 67.
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Causation, Multiple Tortfeasors, and Burden of
Proof

With respect to issues that can have a crucial bearing on the
effectiveness of environmental liability as a compensation
mechanism, the TLL of 2009 also produced interesting
innovations. Article 66 of the TLL provides that:
Where any dispute arises over an environmental pollution, the
polluter shall assume the burden to prove that it should not be
liable or its liability could be mitigated under certain
circumstances as provided for by law or to prove that there is no
causation between its conduct and the harm. 69

Article 66 completely shifts liability to the polluter. As a
consequence of the strict liability introduced in Article 65, it is
the polluter who now bears the burden of proving defenses,
including exemption or mitigation of liability.70 The polluter also
has the burden to prove there is a lack of causation between its
activities and the personal or environmental harm. This could
present a potentially dangerous situation for defendants to the
extent that they may not be able to show that their activity was
not the source of a particular damage suffered by the plaintiffs.71
However, this is not revolutionary either, since a rule of the
reversal of the burden of proof already exists under the CPL of
1992.72 Moreover, the concern of over-deterrence can be balanced
through the implementation of this reversal of burden provision
in practice, which is often criticized as problematic.73

69. TLL, art. 66.
70. Zhang, supra note 7, at 487-88.
71. Economic analysis shows that this rule may lead to over-deterrence of the
potential polluters. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 241. Literature also
shows concern that the TLL allows the reversal of the burden of proof without
requiring even an indication of a casual relationship. See Helmut Koziol & Yan
Zhu, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability Law, 1 J.
EUR. TORT L. 328, 357-58 (2010).
72. SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., [THE OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THE
APPLICATION OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] (1992), available at http://www.lawlib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=54915 (China).
73. See Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897. For more detailed information
about the practice, see infra part II.B.c.
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As far as the multiple polluter case is concerned, the TLL
holds in Article 67 that:
Where the environmental pollution is caused by two or more
polluters, the seriousness of liability of each polluter shall be
determined according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission
and other factors.74

In the case of multiple polluters, damages will be apportioned
based on the type of pollutants and the volume of emissions.75 It
is striking that Chinese law follows a proportional approach in
the case of multiple tortfeasors, but chooses instead to adopt
shifting of the burden of proof (in Article 66) in the case of
uncertain causation.76
The new rules dealing with multiple tortfeasors were also
mentioned as an innovation by Chinese experts we interviewed.77
Before the promulgation of the TLL, in most cases, a joint and
several liability rule applied. The GPCL stipulates that: “If two
or more persons jointly infringe upon another person’s rights and
cause him damage, they shall bear joint liability.”78 The GPCL
and the EPL have no specific provisions on multiple tortfeasors in
the case of environmental liability; thus the general rule under
the GPCL applies.79 However, with the introduction of the TLL,
liability needs to be decided according to the contributions of each
polluter, and a several liability rule applies.

74. TLL, art. 67.
75. Zhang, supra note 7, at 488-89.
76. Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 241.
77. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
78. GPCL, art. 130.
79. According to Article 83 of the Legislation Law, if the same organ
promulgates the rules and there is inconsistency, the specialized rule has
priority over the general rules. In the GPCL and the EPL, the environmental
liability rules are specialized rules and the general tort law is a general rule. If
there is a specific provision on multiple tortfeasors in an environmental liability
case, the specific provision shall have the priority. However, this rule does not
exist in the GPCL and the EPL. Hence the general rule in the GPCL applies.
Legislation Law, art. 83.
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Remedies and Standards

Article 15 of the TLL80 provides for “forms of tort liability”
which in fact enumerate the remedies that could be applied. It is
a long list including:
(1) cessation of infringement;
(2) removal of obstruction;
(3) elimination of danger;
(4) return of property;
(5) restoration to the original status;
(6) compensation for losses;
(7) apology; and
(8) elimination of consequences and restoration of reputation. 81

Article 15 in fine holds that these forms of tort liability can apply
separately or simultaneously.82
As far as environmental harm is concerned, injunctions,
elimination of risk, and restitution may be important as well as,
of course, compensation for losses.83 These remedies, however,
are more suitable for traditional damage.84
As far as
compensation for ecological damage is concerned, difficulties exist
to determine which part of the damage is compensable.85 As
discussed earlier, the environmental liability rules in the TLL do
not explicitly recognize ecological damage as compensable.86

80. TLL, art. 67.
81. TLL, art. 15.
82. Id. (“The above methods of assuming the tort liability may be adopted
individually or jointly”).
83. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 187-89.
84. See supra part II.A.a.
85. How to compensate for natural resource damage has long been hotly
discussed in the United States. See generally Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource
Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 269 (1989) [hereinafter Cross 1989]; Frank
B. Cross, Restoring Restoration for Natural Resource Damages, 24 U. TOL. L.
REV. 319 (1993) [hereinafter Cross 1993]; Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy,
Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural Resource Damage Actions, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005). For a discussion on the difficulties in
quantifying ecological damage in the European Union, see generally G.M. van
den Broek, Environmental Liability and Nature Protection Areas: Will the EU
Environmental Liability Directive Actually Lead to the Restoration of Damaged
Natural Resources?, 5 UTRECHT L. REV. 117 (2009).
86. See supra part II.A.a.
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Therefore, claims are usually limited to require compensation for
direct losses suffered.87 Claims for pure ecological damage are
allowed only when specific legislation has explicit provisions, and
such provisions are usually limited to preventive measures or
restoration measures.88 Even when restoration measures are
concerned, assessment standards lack a determination for
restoring the damage.89 This is especially true for soil pollution;
so far, technical standards have not been defined or are too old to
solve existing problems.90 This means that, for example, quality
standards indicating what the desired quality of the soil is to
which the soil should be restored, do not exist or are not
satisfactory.91 This makes the task of the judge difficult if it
cannot be clearly indicated which restoration standard would be
required. In order to face those difficulties, the government
intends to promulgate assessment standards. A first step in that
direction has been taken in the Recommendation on Methods on
Assessing Environmental Damage, published by the MEP in
2011.92 This document gives some general guidance on how to
assess pure ecological damage in some specific areas, but it is not
a binding standard that can be applied in court.93 Hence, it
87. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
88. Marine oil pollution is such an example. See infra part IV.A.a.
89. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30; Interview with Wang
Jin, Professor, Peking University Law School, in Beijing, China (Aug. 24, 2011)
[hereinafter Interview with Prof. Wang Jin] (on file with authors).
90. Wang Shuyi, [A Few Thoughts on the Drafting of the Soil Pollution
Prevention Act of the People’s Republic of China], 149 L. REV. 73, 74 (2008)
(China).
91. For example, the Environmental Quality Standards for Soil issued in
1995 applied to cultivated lands, pasture, forestry and natural reserve areas.
However, on the one hand the application scope of these standards is very
limited; while on the other hand experts held that many parts of the standards
do not fit the Chinese soil status. See id.
92. The Recommendation on Methods on Assessing Environmental Damage
is developed by the Chinese Academy for Environment Planning, designated by
the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
It is not legally binding.
[RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, 1ST
EDITION], (issued by the Chinese Academy for Env’t Planning, Ministry of Envtl.
Prot.) [hereinafter METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE], available
at http://www.mep.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/W020110530352486511962.pdf
(China).
93. This Recommendation is made by a scientific research center—The
Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning—under the designation of the
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certainly does not solve all problems of ecological damage
assessment.94
Recently, a Temporary Assessment Rule for
Pollution Damage Caused by Environmental Accidents was
published by the MEP, and was made available for consultation
with related public authorities and environmental research
institutes.95 It establishes procedures for responding, assessing,
and restoring pollution damage caused by sudden accidents. How
this rule will be finalized and implemented still waits to be seen.
e.

Access to the Court for Victims

The Civil Procedure Law (CPL)96 in China prescribes the
conditions for a case to be accepted by the court. Article 108
states:
The following requirements must be met when an action is
initiated:
(1) the plaintiff must be an individual, legal person or any other
organization that has a direct interest in the case;
(2) there must be a specific defendant;
(3) there must be a concrete claim, facts and cause of action; and
(4) the action must be within the scope of acceptance for civil
lawsuits of the people’s courts and within the jurisdiction of
the people’s court where it is filed.97

This provision defines the plaintiff narrowly as the one who
has a direct interest in the case. This constrained standing
MEP. It has not approved though the formal legislation procedure and is not a
legally binding document.
94. Since it is not legally binding, judges are still free to choose the method
they regard as appropriate. To what extent the Recommendation has important
practical implications is still waiting to be seen.
95. MINISTRY OF ENVTL. PROT., TEMPORARY ASSESSMENT RULE FOR POLLUTION
DAMAGE CAUSED BY ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS (Consultation Draft), available
at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bgth/201301/t20130128_245592.htm (China).
96. [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, revised Oct. 29,
2007 and Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter CPL], available at http://china.findlaw.cn/
jingjifa/shewaifalv/swflfg/20110414/91492.html (China). Note that this English
version is only updated to include the 2007 revisions, not the 2012 revisions.
However, as far as Article 108 is concerned, the 2007 and 2012 versions are
identical.
97. Id. art. 108.
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makes it possible that a plaintiff will be denied access to the court
if he cannot show direct physical or economic damage.98 Thus an
important hurdle exists when there is no individual damage
involved in pollution incidents. This problem may be remedied by
the newly revised CPL, which allows for public interest
litigation.99 Two drafts to revise the CPL were submitted to the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for
discussion in November 2011 and April 2012.100 The revision was
finally promulgated in August 2012. The first draft added a
public interest litigation provision, stating: “[I]f an activity which
pollutes the environment or violates many consumers’ rights
composes an infringement on the public interest, related public
authorities or social organizations can file litigation.”101 Such a
provision opens a possibility for public authorities and NGOs to
file a lawsuit when there is no individual damage involved.
However, this provision in the first draft was criticized as too
obscure and was narrowed in the final revision.102 The final law
provides that: “[I]f environmental pollution and activities
infringing on many consumers’ legal rights harm public interests,
the authorities and organizations prescribed by law can bring a
suit in the people’s court.”103 In this case, public authorities and
NGOs may bring a claim for ecological damage that concerns the
public interest. However, the provision limits standing to the
parties that are prescribed by law.104 This means that a party

98. Alford & Shen, supra note 15, at 147; Adam Briggs, China’s Pollution
Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 305,
327 (2006).
99. The CPL was revised in 2012 and came into force on January 1, 2013.
[The Decision to Revise the People’s Republic of China Civil Procedure Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012,
effective Jan. 1, 2013) [hereinafter CPL Revision], available at http://www.gov.
cn/flfg/2012-09/01/content_2214662.htm (China).
See China Amends Civil
Procedure Law, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-08/31/
content_26392562.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2014).
100. [First Draft Amendment to the Civil Procedure Law], Nat’l People’s Cong.
(Oct. 29, 2011) [hereinafter CPL Draft 1], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/
npc/xinwen/syxw/2011-10/29/content_1678367.htm (China).
101. CPL Draft 1, pt. 8.
102. CPL Revision, pt. 9.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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can file a case in court only if authorized explicitly by statute.105
For example, under the MEPL, the public authorities in charge of
marine environmental supervision and management can claim
for losses if there is damage to the marine ecosystem, to marine
fishery resources, or to the marine protected areas.106 However,
in other areas where there is no such specific legislation, standing
still constitutes a significant hurdle.107
When standing or other requirements for accepting a case are
not satisfied, the court can issue a verdict to reject the case
according to Article 112 of the CPL:
When a people’s court receives a bill of complaint or an oral
complaint and after review finds that it meets the requirements
for acceptance, [it shall file the case] within seven days and notify
the parties; if the complaint does not meet the requirements for
acceptance, the court shall, within seven days, order that the
complaint be rejected. If the complainant has an objection
against the order, he or she may file an appeal. 108

This provision, in theory, requires a verdict if the court
decides not to accept a case. In other words, the refusal of a case
is supposed to be accompanied by a written rationale, which gives
the plaintiff the possibility to appeal such a decision.109 However,
judges often skip this step in practice.110
The limited standing under the CPL, the conservative
attitude towards public interest litigation, and the arbitrariness
existing in accepting cases have led to heated discussions in
literature on the topic.111 In addition to the provision on public
105. Id.
106. MEPL, art. 90.
107. As explained infra, the new revised CPL provision still needs the
authorities and organizations to be “prescribed by law.” If there is no legislation
to authorize the authorities or organizations, then the standing difficulty is
unresolved.
108. CPL, art. 112.
109. Id.
110. Rachel Stern, From Dispute to Decision: Suing Polluters in China, 206
CHINA Q. 294, 297 (2011); for details see supra part II.A.c.
111. See, e.g., Christine J. Lee, “Pollute First, Control Later” No More:
Combating Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based
in Public Interest Litigation and Public Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
795, 814 (2008); Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in
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interest litigation, the revised CPL has another provision aimed
at protecting the plaintiff’s right to sue.112 It revises Article 112
of the CPL by adding one sentence, stating: “[T]he Court should
protect the parties’ right to sue according to law.”113 It further
clarifies that “if the requirements for accepting a case are not
satisfied, the court shall make a written verdict to reject the
case.”114 Compared to the existing provisions, the revision
explicitly requires that the verdict rejecting a case should be
written, so that the parties’ right to appeal can be better
protected.115
B. Practice
From the outset it should be stated that, unfortunately, there
is overwhelming evidence of the dire state of the environment in
China.116 In a recent study, Nagle reports that two-thirds of the
360 million urban residences in China suffer from unhealthy
levels of air pollution, that serious pollution of the surface waters
exists in China, and that China is now the largest emitter of
carbon dioxide in the world.117 In this part, we will examine how
compensation for environmental damage works in practice in
China. We look both at liability for traditional damage, and at
ecological damage.
a. Who Acts After An Incident?
After an environmental incident occurs or pollution is
detected, the first issue that arises is whether an investigation

China: Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 220 (2007). See generally
Briggs, supra note 98; Stern, supra note 110.
112. CPL Revision, pt. 29.
113. CPL Revision, pt. 29.
114. Id.
115. Sometimes the court refuses to accept a case without giving a written
verdict. Without such a verdict, the plaintiff cannot prove that he has already
tried to file a case in the court, and this right to litigation may be endangered.
However, the new revised CPL requires a written verdict, hence the plaintiff can
have such proof.
116. See generally THE WORLD BANK, supra note 1.
117. See John Copeland Nagle, How Much Should China Pollute?, 12 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 591, 591-92 (2011).
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and cleanup is taken, rather than compensation. Especially,
when there is only damage to the environment, but no individual
loss, cleanup or restoration is an important step towards damage
assessment and compensation.118
It may not be surprising that the interviews we held all
confirmed that the most important player in demanding
restoration after environmental pollution is the government.119
Historically many enterprises involved in heavy industry were—
and to a large extent still are—State-owned enterprises.120 This
may have disadvantages when it comes to the incentives of public
authorities to “go harsh” on polluters, but it also leads to an
acceptance that the government may be responsible for historic
pollution, and therefore, it may be the primary party who should
take action to clean up especially historically polluted sites.121
When referring to the government in China, this can either be the
central government or the local authorities, depending upon the
division of competences. However, usually the government only
takes cleanup action in response to emergency situations; longerterm restoration does not take place.122
However, there may be situations in which the government
will attempt to shift costs to polluters. The State Council
initiated a policy entitled “from two to three.”123 Policymakers
advocated for changing Chinese industry from a heavy secondary
industry to a less polluting tertiary industry.124 This policy
entails identifying soil pollution after the industry is relocated,
and restoring the soil quality given the changing use of the
site.125
In some cases, local governments undertake the
118. Restoration has been widely accepted as the primary instrument to
assess natural resources/ecological damage. See generally Cross 1989, supra
note 85; Cross 1993, supra note 85; Kanner & Nagy, supra note 85.
119. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
120. Id.
121. Interview with a Representative, Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP), in Beijing, China (Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with MEP Rep.]
(on file with authors).
122. See Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
123. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. JIAN XIE & FASHENG LI, THE WORLD BANK, OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT
SITUATION ON BROWNFIELD REMEDIATION AND REDEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4-5
(2010),
available
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
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restoration themselves and pass on the restoration costs in the
land transfer fees, or in the alternative, require the redevelopers
(to whom the land use rights have been transferred) to restore
costs under the government’s supervision.126 The restoration at
the Beijing Hongshi Paint Plant site provides a good illustration.
That site once housed a pesticide plant that was later
transformed into a paint plant. Site assessment showed that the
contaminated soil amounted to 140,000 cubic meters.127
Following the plant’s relocation, the government asked for bids
for its redevelopment. During the bidding process, the winning
bidder is required to prepare and implement a restoration plan in
accordance with the contaminated soil disposal plan, as
formulated by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau. As
a result, the developers spent tens of millions RMB on soil
remediation.128
This flexibility allows the government to use administrative
law to require the polluter to conduct more risk assessment and
to cleanup the sediment.129 This option also means that the
nature of the remedies used in practice, specifically in soil
pollution cases, are often more administrative130 or economic131
in nature than classic tort law remedies.132 The remedies applied
in practice will be further discussed below.133
SWPPL is a statute that expressly allows public authorities
to take responsive action to pollution. Article 55 provides:
An entity that discharges hazardous wastes shall dispose
hazardous wastes according to relevant provisions of the State,
and shall not dump or pile up them without approval; those that
[do not] treat hazardous wastes shall be ordered to get right
within the time limit by the environmental protection

WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/11/18/000333037_20101118233821/Rendere
d/PDF/579530ESW0P1191se0situation0EN0Full.pdf.
126. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121.
127. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 23.
128. Id.
129. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121.
130. Id. (discussing forcing polluters to restore the polluted environment).
131. See id. (discussing passing on cleanup costs to the developer of the site).
132. See generally TLL.
133. See infra part II.B.f.
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administrative departments of the people’s governments at or
above the county level; if an entity fails to treat within the time
limit or in accordance with relevant provisions of the State,
another entity shall be commissioned to carry out the treatment
by the environmental protection administrative departments of
the people’s governments at or above the county level, and the
expenses incurred therefrom shall be undertaken by the entity
that discharges hazardous wastes.134

This provision allows the agencies to independently treat the
waste and redirect any incurred costs to the polluter.135
However, China’s government may not be willing to apply this
provision for fear that collecting costs from polluters will be too
difficult.136
This first item, being who usually takes action in case of
damage to the environment, already shows a few typical features
of the compensation system in China.
Given the historic
responsibility of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), the
government’s role is well-defined.137 Second, public authorities,
realizing that it may be difficult to recover costs from polluters,
may be unwilling to accept such measures.138 Third, public
authorities will usually target emergency measures or new
development possibilities of the polluted sites rather than longterm environmental protection goals.139
Fourth, original
remedies have been historically sought, including passing costs
on to developers.140 Historically, more attention has been given
to water and air pollution, while soil pollution, which often
manifests itself only after decades, especially when the polluted
sites are not redeveloped, is largely neglected.141 The seriousness
134. SWPPL, art. 55.
135. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
136. Id.
137. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
138. A big market may be created by the soil restoration, but three obstacles
prevent its development. See [Soil Restoration May Accelerate A Huge Market,
But Three Obstacles Prevent Its Development], CHINESE DAILY ECON. NEWS
(July 29, 2013), http://money.163.com/13/0729/02/94TRP0TA00253B0H.html
(China).
139. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
140. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121.
141. Id.
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of China’s soil pollution situation has only recently gained public
attention.142 In cases where contaminated sites have been
remediated, there is often wide media coverage and
redevelopment. For example, the remediation at the sites for the
Shanghai 2010 Expo, the Beijing No. 3 Chemical Plant, and the
Beijing Hongtushi Paint Plant gained expansive public
attention.143
b. Dispute Resolution
An environmental accident may lead to contentious disputes
between polluters and victims, and the manner in which to
resolve such disputes is an important issue. Liability rules
discussed in the theoretical part of this article are mainly
relevant when a dispute ends up in court. However, in practice,
only a small fraction of disputes actually reach the court.144
Literature demonstrates that a three-step procedure is
involved when citizens develop grievances and claims from
accidents.145 The citizens first identify the accidents (naming);
then attribute them to other parties (blaming); and finally seek
remedies from those parties (shaming).146 When citizens suffer
grievances (losses), they initially attempt to negotiate with the
blamed party. If negotiation fails, a small percentage of citizens
will involve third parties to seek a remedy.147 In China, such a
remedy could be either a legal or a political action (including
complaints and petitions to enforcement authorities, petitions to
higher levels of government, media involvement and collective
actions).148 Of the two options, parties do not often seek legal
142. See generally XIE & LI, supra note 125.
143. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 5.
144. Zhao, supra note 12, at 174.
145. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635-37 (1980).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Jun Ma, The Rise of Social Accountability in China, 71 AUSTL. J. PUB.
ADMIN. 111, 113 (2012); Benjamin van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution:
Understanding Citizen Action Against Pollution in China, 19 J. CONTEMP. CHINA
55, 57 (2010) (explaining that a lot of recent literature has focused on how
victims and the public act against pollution in China) [hereinafter van Rooij,
The People vs. Pollution], available at http://www.cerium.ca/IMG/pdf/People_
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action.149 It is reported that there were 4453, 1545 and 2136 civil
litigations against polluters in 2004, 2005, and 2006,
respectively.150 In 2006, the Environmental Protection Bureau
received 616,122 pollution-related complaints and petitions from
citizens.151 Reasons for Chinese citizens’ unwillingness to use
legal action for solving pollution disputes include cultural
characteristics152 and institutional and practical barriers to
litigation.153 Even when the cases finally reach the court, the
vulnerability of judges to political pressure, uncertainty about the
law, and political ambiguity make the trial a complicated
procedure, with varying degrees of legal formality and judicial
autonomy.154
Mediation is another formal option for pollution victims to
seek a remedy. There are three types of mediation from which
victims can choose.155 The victims can go to the People’s
Mediation Committees at the local level, which are known as
“Residents’ Committees” in urban areas and “Villagers’
Committees” in rural areas.156 Often, these committees solve the
disputes between township/community enterprises, solely-owned
workshops, and their neighbors.157 However, concerns exist
vs_pollution_China.pdf. See generally Peter Ho, Greening Without Conflict?
Environmentalism, Green NGOs and Civil Society in China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE
893 (2001); BRYAN TILT, THE STRUGGLE FOR SUSTAINABILITY IN RURAL CHINA:
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2010) (providing an in-depth
analysis on people’s action in rural areas); Benjamin van Rooij et al., The
Compensation Trap: The Limits of Community-Based Pollution Regulation in
China, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 701 (2012) [hereinafter van Rooij, The
Compensation Trap], available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/
iss3/2.
149. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 61-62.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 63-6 (stating that the “level of income, education, dependency
on the polluting source for income, and organization” are all obstacles
preventing the citizens from going to court to seek a remedy for the harm they
have suffered from pollution).
153. See infra part II.B.c.
154. See generally Rachel E. Stern, On the Frontlines: Making Decisions in
Chinese Civil Environmental Lawsuits, 32 LAW & POL’Y 79 (2010), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/1788.
155. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 162-64.
156. Id. at 162.
157. Id.
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about the quality of the mediators, the balance in the
compromise, and the legal basis, as well as the enforcement of
mediated agreements.158 A second possibility for the victim is to
seek administrative mediation in the Environmental Protection
Bureaus (EPBs) or other public authorities.159 This option is
supposedly a faster and more efficient solution than litigation.160
While some cases show such advantages in practice, other cases
demonstrate the reluctance of public authorities to resolve
pollution disputes.161 One explanation is the lack of financial or
human resources of EPBs and the lack of binding force of the
mediation outcome.162 A third option is court-provided judicial
mediation; however, this option is sometimes criticized for the
strong role given to the judges at the expense of accurately
reflecting the opinions of the parties in dispute.163
c. Barriers to Access to Justice
Theory demonstrates that with traditional damage, victims
have standing in the court, and some legal designs try to relieve
their burdens, such as the reversal of the burden of proof.164
However, in practice, barriers often prevent effective victims from
obtaining adequate compensation. The most important barrier
remains whether the court will accept the case.165 In a Chinese
court, the filing division (li’an ting) determines the acceptance of
a case.166 As discussed supra, according to the CPL, the judges
have to render a verdict if a case is rejected.167 However, in
practice, this step is often skipped, thus leaving the plaintiffs
without a record of refusal.168 In practice, a case may be rejected,
because an administrative solution is forthcoming, or because law

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 163-64.
Zhao, supra note 12, at 164.
See id. at 166.
See id. at 166-70.
See id. at 169.
Id. at 170.
See infra part II.A.c.
Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
Stern, supra note 12, at 22.
See infra part II.A.e.
Stern, supra note 110, at 297.
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is not regarded as a proper solution for that dispute.169 It is even
more problematic when cases are politically sensitive.170 One
example where the court refused to accept the environmental
case without a written verdict is a petro-chemical case, involving
PetroChina.171 Due to an operational defect in 2005, an explosion
occurred at a petro-chemical plant owned by PetroChina
This explosion and consequent emergency
Corporation.172
measures led to a large amount of toxic substances spilled into
the Songhua River.173 This led to a temporary water supply
shortage in Harbin City, and a direct economic loss up to 1.5
billion RBM.174 Apart from direct economic loss, the incident led
to a significant ecological loss.175 However, the constrained
standing provision in the CPL created a challenge for claims for
such loss.176 After this environmental incident, some experts
filed a civil public interest litigation with nature as a jointplaintiff in the High People’s Court of Heilongjiang.177 However,
according to Chinese law, nature does not have standing, and the
experts did not suffer a direct loss. Hence, the court did not
accept the case.178
169. Id.
170. Interview with Kathinka Fürst, Researcher for Amsterdam University,
Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims, in Beijing, China (Aug. 23,
2011) (on file with authors).
171. Wang Canfa, Pondering Over the Incident of Songhua River Pollution
from the Perspective of Environmental Law, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 291
(Michael Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008).
172. Id.
173. Wang Jin & Huang Chiachen, Reflections from the Transboundary
Pollution of Songhua River, in CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY: LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION 273-74 (Michael
Faure & Song Ying eds., 2008).
174. Wang, supra note 171, at 291.
175. See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM, THE SONGHUA
RIVER SPILL CHINA, DECEMBER 2005: FIELD MISSION REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.unep.org/PDF/China_Songhua_River_Spill_draft_7_301205.pdf
(offering an overview of pollution’s impact on the Songhua River).
176. According to the CPL, the plaintiff should have a direct interest involved
in the case. See CPL, art. 108(1). However, ecological damage concerns the
general public, but not individuals. Hence, obstacles exist when the individual
tries to assert a claim on behalf to the environment.
177. Wang & Huang, supra note 173, at 273-74.
178. Id. at 301.
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Another hurdle for victims to overcome before going to court
is the acceptance fee system. According to the CPL, when parties
file a civil litigation, they pay an acceptance fee.179 The fee
variation for plaintiffs is usually 0.5% to 4% of the compensation
requested.180 This can be costly for the victims who have already
suffered serious harm. Although the law allows an application
for a reduction, waiver, or postponed payment of the fee,181 the
reliance on such fees for the court’s operational budget creates
disincentives to grant waivers.182 Lawyers are rarely inclined to
apply for waivers out of concern that a waiver will bias the judges
to their client’s disadvantage.183
Even in a situation in which the court agrees to hear the
plaintiff’s case, a plaintiff may still face substantial problems.
Specifically, defendants generally possess great industrial,
economic, and political power.
Moreover, judges are
inexperienced in handling pollution cases. Thus, a plaintiff’s
chance of winning is substantially reduced.184
A pollution incident may cause damage to a large number of
victims. The CPL provides that if one or more parties, involving
two or more individuals, bring an action of comparable subject
matter, the separate lawsuits can be tried together as a class
action.185 Class actions make litigation more efficient and create
wide publicity of the lawsuit, thus making it easier for the victims
to obtain a remedy.186 However, in practice, there is a trend to
restrict the use of class actions. In 2005, the Supreme People’s
Court issued a Notice Regarding Problems with the Acceptance of
Class Action Lawsuits by the People’s Courts, which limits the
number of class action suits.187 Specifically, courts are given the
179. CPL, art. 107.
180. Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Briggs, supra note 98, at 327.
184. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
185. CPL, art. 53, 54.
186. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 176-77.
187. [Notice regarding Problems with the Acceptance of Class Action Lawsuits
by the People’s Courts] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 30, 200 ,
effective Jan. 1, 2006), available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/fgkd/xfg/
sfwj/200904/20090400132228.shtml (China); see Wang, supra note 111, at 215.
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discretion to divide class action suits if the case would present too
many difficulties.188 Moreover, the notice redirects jurisdiction
over class action suits to a lower level. Recently, courts have
been inclined to split up class actions in order to increase the
charged court fee and the number of cases.189 Since large class
actions are more likely to draw wide media coverage and attract
attention from higher-level authorities, the courts prefer dealing
with these cases on an individual basis in order to avoid bad
However, solving cases at a local level may
publicity.190
strengthen the effects of local protectionism.191
Additionally, there may be genuine problems in proving the
environmental claims of the victim. Victims of environmental
damage face traditional problems such as providing proof of the
damage and proving proximate cause.192 According to Article 66
of the TLL, the burden of proof of exemptions and causation is
shifted to the polluter.193 However, experts have reported that,
in practice, proving causation remains a problem. The reversal of
proof existed in Chinese law before the promulgation of the
TLL.194 In practice, it was not fully implemented—before the
judges decided to shift the burden of proof to the polluters, they
sometimes required a different degree of preliminary proof from
the plaintiffs.195 In order to shift the burden, the court could
require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was polluting the
environment.196 In other cases, the victims are required to

188. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 69.
189. Zhao, supra note 12, at 177.
190. See id.
191. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 69.
192. Id.; Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
193. See infra part II.A.c.
194. See [Supreme People’s Court Opinion on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of the Civil Procedure Law] Sup. People’s Ct. (promulgated July 1 ,
1992, effective July 14, 1992), art. 74, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/
display.aspx?lib=law&id=6690&CGid= (China) (“Parties in a litigation should
provide proof for his claims. However, in the following tort cases, if the
defendant denies the facts asserted by the plaintiff, the burden of proof lies with
the defendant: . . . claims for damages caused by environmental pollution . . . .”).
195. Moser & Yang, supra note 4, at 10897.
196. See Joseph McMullin, Comment, Do Chinese Environmental Laws Work?
A Study of Litigation as a Response to the Problem of Fishery Pollution in China,
26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 142, 168-71 (2009).
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produce preliminary evidence that shows “it is more likely than
not that the defendant polluted the environment and caused the
victim harm.”197
A lower burden scenario requires the
satisfaction of three criteria: “[(1)] the plaintiff has suffered a
quantifiable loss; [(2)] this harm has been proven to be caused by
pollution and [(3)] in the relevant temporal and physical space
there is a possible source of this environmental pollution.”198 In
some extreme cases, the victims are asked to provide direct
evidence that the harm was caused by pollution.199 This variance
in practice shows that without clear criteria for determining
causation, and practical guidance on applying the burden of proof,
a simple provision reversing the burden of proof cannot guarantee
its implementation.
d. NGOs
The above analysis shows the difficulties for individual
victims to resort to judicial protection. Hence, one may expect a
positive role for NGOs, which can assist the individual victims to
make claims for traditional damage, and can also get involved
when only ecological damage is concerned.
In China, environmental NGOs (eNGOs) are still in their
early stages of development.200 In 1978, the China Society for
Environmental Sciences established the first eNGO in China.201
Finally in the 1990s, eNGOs began to develop more rapidly.202
Reports indicate that there were 2768 eNGOs in China in 2005,
and the number grew to 3539 in 2008.203 According to scholars,
changes in political opportunities, mobilized organizational
197. Id.
198. McMullin, supra note 196, at 168-71.
199. Id.
200. The eNGOs only started to develop rapidly in China after 1994. The
number of eNGOs has increased significantly; however, there is still a heavy
dependency on the government, and they function quite differently from western
eNGOs. See generally Bao Maohong, Environmental NGOs in Transforming
China, 4 NATURE & CULTURE 1 (2009).
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 2-3.
203. Zhan Xueyong & Tang Shui-Yan, Political Opportunities, Resource
Constraints and Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China, 91 PUB.
ADMIN. 2, 4 (2011).
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resources, the influence of international communications, the
Internet, and media fueled the rapid rise in eNGO growth.204
Nevertheless, substantial obstacles bar eNGOS from reaching full
prosperity.
For example, eNGOs face strict legal and
administrative barriers, which make their legitimacy a serious
concern.205 Estimates show that only 23.3% of the eNGOs are
registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and therefore, the
remainder are illegal.206 Of those registered, only a small
fraction are registered as social organizations with tax-exemption
status; other eNGOs are registered as private non-profit
organizations, corporations, or student-led social organizations.207
Since many of the eNGOs are government-organized (GONGOs),
the government is influential in their establishment.208 In 2009,
among the 2768 eNGOs in China, 49.9% were GONGOs, 40.3%
were student-led organizations, 2.5% were branches of
international NGOs, and only 7.3% were grassroots (citizenorganized) NGOs.209 This governmental characteristic, coupled
with the political and institutional backgrounds, make eNGOs
reluctant to take confrontational action.210 The majority of their
efforts
target
promoting
environmental
consciousness,
sustainable development and public participation.211 Since 95%
of eNGOs practice under the principle of “help, but not make
trouble; participate, but not intervene; supervise, but not replace;
act, but not violate,”212 few eNGOs try to help pollution victims
through lawsuits and challenges to local firms.213 Recently,
however, eNGOs have begun playing a larger role in the domain
of policy advocacy. Such roles include helping victims file

204. Id. at 14; Yang Guobin, Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics
in China, 181 CHINA Q. 46, 47 (2005). See generally Jiang Ru & Leonard
Ortolano, Development of Citizen-Organized Environmental NGOs in China, 20
VOLUNTAS 141 (2009).
205. Bao, supra note 200, at 7-8.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Zhan & Tang, supra note 203, at 36.
208. See Bao, supra note 200, at 7.
209. Bao, supra note 200, at 7; see generally Ru & Ortolano, supra note 204.
210. See Bao, supra note 200, at 8.
211. Id. at 5-6.
212. Id. at 8.
213. Id.
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lawsuits, challenging local firms, and influencing the function of
the State.214 For instance, some eNGOs provide legal aid to
pollution victims and support them in lawsuits against
polluters.215 The Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims
(CLAPV) is such an organization.216 CLAPV reportedly received
over 10,000 complaints from citizens during its eight years of
operation, and got directly involved in 104 of them.217
In addition to supporting individuals to file a lawsuit against
polluters, eNGOs recently started to file public interest litigation
on their own behalf. For example, the All China Environment
Federation, a large GONGO in China, reportedly filed four public
environmental litigations in 2011, two of which were successful,
and the remainders are still pending.218 The case, All China
Environment Federation v. Jiangsu Jiangyin Container, Inc., was
their first environmental civil public litigation to be accepted by
the court.219
ENGOs’ increasing role in environmental litigation is in line
with the introduction of the environmental court in some local
and intermediate courts in recent years.220 It is reported that
there are eighty-six environmental courts at different levels in
China as of October 2011,221 of which the environmental courts in

214. Yan Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 70.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See generally China Environment Federation, [2011 China Environment
Federation Environmental Activist Services Briefing], NETEASE (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://gongyi.163.com/12/0213/11/7Q504CLB00933KC8.html (China).
219. See generally [Following China’s First Environmental Public Interest
Litigation: Towards Constitutional “Environmental Rights”], CHINANEWS (Nov.
28,
2009),
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/11-28/1989095.shtml
(China).
220. Some environmental courts have opened the possibility for NGOs to bring
public interest litigation. See GAO JIE, NATURAL. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CHINA
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT, DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS IN
CHINA: THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES AND IMPLEMENTATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2009), available at http://www.
iucnael.org/zh/component/search/?searchword=environmental+court&ordering=
&searchphrase=all.
221. Minchun Zhang & Bao Zhang, Specialized Environmental Courts in
China: Status Quo, Challenges and Responses, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 361, 361 (2012).
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the intermediate courts of Guiyang, Wuxi, and Kunming are the
most reported.222 Those courts have issued some documents to
guide the scope of the cases that the environmental courts shall
accept. Some have mentioned specifically that eNGOs are eligible
plaintiffs to file public interest litigations.223 These documents
alleviate the legal obstacles for eNGOs to bring public litigation
in some local courts. However, a written rule alone cannot
guarantee the sufficient involvement of eNGOs.224 Despite the
rapid introduction of environmental courts nationwide, the
caseload for these courts remains low, especially for pubic
interest litigations brought by eNGOs.225 Moreover, courts
remain cautious in accepting controversial cases against powerful
defendants.226
e. Quantifying Environmental Damage
A major problem identified by experts is that technical
information, as well as legal norms to adopt an appropriate
evaluation of environmental damage, are often lacking. For
example, environmental impact assessment studies provide de
facto little information on the background level of environmental
health (like epidemiological surveys). When background levels
are lacking, it becomes obviously difficult to evaluate to what
extent emissions from a particular industry would have

222. See generally GAO, supra note 220.
223. See generally GAO, supra note 220.
224. See generally Darcey J. Goelz, China’s Environmental Problems: Is a
Specialized Court the Solution?, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 155 (2009); Alex L.
Wang & Gao Jie, Environmental Courts and the Development of Environmental
Public Interest Litigation in China, 3 J. CT. INNOVATION 37 (2010) (noting that in
spite of the rapid establishment of environmental courts in recent years, many
scholars are cautious about the potential achievement of such instruments).
225. Wang & Gao, supra note 224, at 42.
226. Although legislation and practice have begun to open up space for public
interest litigation, literature holds that the actual effect of this new type of
litigation is still moderate. See generally Jingjing Liu, Environmental Justice
with Chinese Characteristics: Recent Developments in Using Environmental
Public Interest Litigation to Strengthen Access to Environmental Justice, 7 FLA.
A & M U.L. REV. 229 (2012).
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contributed to the harm.227 When it comes to quantifying the
damage to the environment itself, it is even more difficult. With
the exception of assessing the fishery losses caused by water
pollution,228 the standards on how to assess damages are usually
missing. For example, the problem associated with soil pollution
is not only that prior information on background levels is missing,
but also that appropriate standards are lacking.229 In China,
technologies concerning the restoration of polluted sites are to a
large extent still being developed, and have only been brought to
the market in recent years.230 In response to this situation, the
government has begun developing methodologies to assess pure
environmental damage, and has recently commenced trials in
some areas.231
f. Remedies
As discussed earlier, the Chinese legal framework allows
different types of remedies for pollution victims,232 which can be
divided into two large categories: (1) compensation; and (2)
elimination of harm. The category of “elimination of harm”
includes cessation of infringement, elimination of danger, and
restoration to original status.233 Cessation of infringement is an
injunction to stop an ongoing infringing action; elimination of
danger stops an action that substantially threatens the
environment; and restoration remediates the polluted
227. Interview with Ms. Ma, South China Institute of Environmental Sciences,
in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Ms. Ma] (on
file with authors).
228. [Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses from Water Pollution Accidents]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Agric., Oct. 8, 1996, effective Oct. 8, 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses], available at
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=12796 (China).
229. For example, standards to evaluate the level of restoration for a polluted
site. See Interview with Dr. Cai, South China Institute of Environmental
Sciences, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with authors).
230. See id.
231. See [Opinions on Evaluating Environmental Pollution Damage],
(promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., May 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Opinions on Environmental Pollution Damage], available at http://www.mep.
gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bwj/201105/t20110530_211357.htm (China).
232. See supra part II.A.d.
233. Zhao, supra note 12, at 187-88.
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environment to its original status.234 However, in practice,
judges are reluctant to order an injunction for several reasons.
Some injunction orders, such as suspension or closing a factory,
are usually regarded as political decisions, so the court rarely
uses them without political commitment initiated by the
government.235 Even if the court chooses to order an injunction,
such as “cessation of infringement,” this is still too broad a
concept to use in practice. Without further clarifying how to
accomplish such an injunction, it may still remain unenforced.236
Another related issue is that sometimes economic
alternatives are used instead of legal remedies. In the early
stages of environmental awareness, due to the difficulties of
environmental litigation, the goals of plaintiffs were often to
obtain compensation indirectly in terms of job opportunities,
This arrangement was
rather than monetary damages.237
intended to provide some social security. In those instances, the
question of quantification of damage did not arise. However, it
was indicated that with the development of the market economy
and increasing environmental awareness, this type of socioeconomic compensation to victims may no longer work; in that
case, quantification of damages becomes an important issue.238
Remedies for pure environmental damage are even more
problematic. Environmental damage is not specifically addressed
in legislation—with the exception of marine pollution—making it
unclear whether there is an existing obligation to restore the
environment, as well as how the damage should be
compensated.239 As mentioned above, quantification of such

234. Id.
235. Zhao, supra note 12, at 188.
236. In Zhang Changjian et al. v. Pingan Rongping Chemical Plant, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant caused serious damage to the biodiversity
in the neighborhood, especially fishery losses to the villagers. The court ordered
the defendant to compensate the victims and to stop the infringement
immediately without further clarifying the manner by which the defendant
ought to comply. Several years after the judgment, it was still unclear whether
the defendant had taken any action in response to the order. See Wang, supra
note 111, at 212-17.
237. Interview with Ms. Ma, supra note 227.
238. Id.
239. See supra part II.A.a.
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damage in this case is a major issue.240 But the MEP has
launched an experiment in some provinces and cities with respect
to environmental damage assessments, in order to gain
experience, which could later be adopted as a comprehensive
According to the Recommendation on
national system.241
Methods of Assessing Environmental Damage, a restoration-based
approach has been implemented to evaluate the pure
environmental damage.242
Use of a more socio-economic based approach to remedying
environmental damage is still prevalent; this is especially
noticeable in the case of soil pollution. A restoration claim is
usually incited by the relocation of old industries. For instance,
the relocation of hundreds of old industrial facilities from Beijing
to the city outskirts left behind eight million square meters of
brownfields in need of redevelopment.243 According to the Beijing
EPB document, before industrial land is transformed to another
use, an environmental impact assessment should be undertaken
to determine the extent of the soil pollution, and the polluters
should be held responsible for the cleanup.244 However, in
practice, recovery from polluters according to the “polluter pays”
principle is not always feasible. The former industrial polluters
may have ceased to exist or can no longer afford the costs.
Furthermore, polluters are often SOEs, and therefore, the
government has no strong incentive to pursue them.245 Instead of
holding the SOEs liable, the government prefers to seek socioeconomic remedies from the polluters, such as requesting that
they increase investitures to improve the local economy.246 The
government also seeks institutional arrangements for
redevelopment where new developers pay a higher price for the
development project or are required to undertake restoration
240. Id.
241. See Opinions on Environmental Pollution Damage, supra note 231.
242. See supra part II.A.d.
243. XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 4.
244. See [Notice of the Beijing Environmental Protection Agency on
Evaluation of the Soil Environment at Former Industrial Sites] (promulgated by
Beijing Envtl. Prot. Bureau, July 6, 2007) (China).
245. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89; Interview with MEP Rep.,
supra note 121.
246. See Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
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themselves.247 One example is the restoration of the Beijing
Hongshi Paint Plant site.248 The legal basis for these transfers is
that all land is state-owned or collectively owned, and that the
industry only has a use-right of the land.249 The government can
require in the bidding document that the new developers
receiving the land-use right take restoration measures.250
C. Summary
The theoretical possibilities for recovering environmental
damages in China seem viable, especially since the new TLL
reconfirmed a strict liability rule that was already incorporated in
special legislation. Moreover, a reversal of the burden of proving
exceptions and the absence of causation should lead to conditions
in favor of victims in future litigation. However, it is clear that
Chinese legislation regarding remedies for environmental harm
pay more attention to direct economic losses than to pure
environmental damage. Acceptance procedures and a fee system
also limit the ability of plaintiffs to receive access to justice.
This was largely confirmed in interviews, which proved that
in the case of environmental damage, it is often the government
who obtains recoveries for environmental harm, and as discussed
above, they do not have a strong incentive to pursue SOEs.
NGOs currently play a limited role in litigation, given the huge
barriers concerning access to justice, including formal statutory
barriers, such as the court’s allowance of a case, and problems
concerning the expertise and knowledge of the judiciary.
Most remedies are of a socio-economic nature, for example,
forcing polluting industries to reinvest in the local economy.
There seems to be little focus on long-term restoration of the
environment and providing individual restorative justice to
victims; victims may even be paid off with relatively small
amounts of compensation, thereby not providing incentives for

247. For some of the examples, see XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 21-27.
248. See supra part II.B.a.
249. George C.S. Lin & Samuel P.S. Ho, The State, Land System, and Land
Development Processes in Contemporary China, 95 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRAPHERS 411, 420 (2005).
250. See, e.g., XIE & LI, supra note 125, at 21-27.
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serious investments in preventive technologies. The economic
concept that environmental liability provides incentives for
polluters to invest in efficient abatement technologies is based on
the theory that potential polluters are exposed to the full social
costs of their activity, and will hence be sufficiently deterred by a
finding of liability.251 The overview of the practice shows that the
probability of the polluter being held liable to pay damages is
quite low; in fact, it is often not the polluter, but rather the new
developer who is invited to compensate for the harm. Moreover,
the amount of paid compensation only seems to be a fraction of
the true social losses caused by environmental harm. It is
therefore doubtful that, given the current practice, environmental
liability can play a preventive role in China.
III. INSURANCE
This section details possibilities for the implementation of
environmental insurance in China. Given the limited scope of
environmental liability,252 it is unsurprising that so far
environmental insurance has not played a major role in China.
However, if one were to allocate a greater role to liability
mechanisms in providing compensation for environmental harm,
the question arises as to what extent this liability can actually be
covered by insurance. This inquiry is important for victims who
may otherwise be confronted with an insolvent—and hence
judgment-proof—defendant. The literature also indicates that
insolvency will allow polluters to externalize the harm to society,
which can lead to under-deterrence.253

251. See DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY, AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 18-50 (Michael
Faure ed., 2003) (discussing the economic analysis of environmental liability).
252. See supra part II.C.
253. See generally Peter-J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to
Purchase Insurance, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996); Mattias K. Polborn,
Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem, 18 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 141 (1998).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3

38

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

264

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

A. Theory
In this part we focus on the possibilities for polluters to
obtain environmental insurance.
It focuses on general
environmental insurance, not insurance for particular risks, such
as marine oil pollution254 or for nuclear liability.255
a. Statutory Background
To what extent does a statutory duty exist to purchase
liability insurance? When the extent of the damage can exceed
the individual wealth of the injurer, an insolvency problem may
arise, justifying the introduction of mandatory insurance.256 The
literature has largely argued in favor of the introduction of
environmental liability insurance to guarantee both effective
compensation to victims, and avoidance of under-deterrence
resulting from the judgment-proof problem.257
General
environmental statutes in China, including the new TLL of
2009,258 are generally silent on compulsory insurance or other
financial guarantees; exceptions only exist for marine oil
pollution.259 Environmental insurance is a new product in China;
only recently has the government started a policy to promote the
development of the environmental insurance markets. In 2007,
the MEP and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued
a document requiring local authorities to conduct research and

254. See infra part IV.
255. We do not discuss nuclear liability and its insurance in China in this
contribution. See generally Liu Jing & Michael Faure, Compensating Nuclear
Damage in China, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 781 (2012).
256. When a serious insolvency risk exists, the insured only has incentives to
buy insurance up to the amount of his or her assets, rather than for the entirety
of the damage caused. In this situation, compulsory insurance will make the
insured internalize the entire costs created by him or her. See Faure, supra note
251, at 181-85; Gerhard Wagner, (Un)insurability and the Choice Between
Market Insurance and Public Compensation Systems, in SHIFTS IN
COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 110 (Willem H. van Boom
& Michael Faure eds., 2007).
257. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING
SYSTEMIC RISKS 211-20 (2003).
258. See infra part II.A.a.
259. See Faure & Hu, supra note 12, at 237.
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experiments on environmental liability insurance.260 There are
also a few voluntary environmental liability insurance programs
promoted by some local governments. In 2008 the city of
Shenyang promulgated the first local regulation, Shenyang
Regulation on Preventing Pollution from Dangerous Waste,261
which is the first local regulation that touched upon
environmental liability insurance in China.
Under this
regulation, insurers are encouraged to establish products to cover
environmental liability from dangerous waste, and potential
polluters are encouraged to seek such coverage.262
b. Theoretical Insurance Options263
Insurance experts report that insurance coverage for
environmental harm in China is theoretically possible on three
bases.264
A general liability insurance policy is the first
possibility to which enterprises can subscribe. This type of
general liability insurance focuses on industrial accidents,
covering environmental damage related to bodily injury, property
damage or even pure ecological losses.265 The broad definition of
environmental liability can create difficulties when attempting to
differentiate from liability caused by other industrial activities.266

260. See [Guidance on the Development of Environmental Pollution Liability
Insurance] (promulgated by the Ministry of Envtl. Prot. & the China Ins. Reg.
Comm’n, Dec. , 2007), available at http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/gw/huanfa/
200802/t20080220_118389.htm (China).
261. See Shenyang Regulation on Preventing Pollution from Dangerous Waste,
supra note 67, art. 8.
262. Id.
263. We realize that this already touches upon practice. However, in this part
we describe the insurance policies that could theoretically cover environmental
harm. In part III.B infra, we discuss to what extent these policies are used in
practice, and the problems that arise in that respect.
264. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, Munich Reinsurance Company,
in Munich, Germany (Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Mr. Christian
Lahnstein] (on file with authors).
265. General liability insurance is used broadly to cover environmental
liability. See BIO INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY DIRECTIVE (ELD) AND RELATED
FINANCIAL SECURITY ISSUES, 53-54 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/legal/liability/pdf/ELD%20Study%20November%202009.pdf.
266. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, supra note 264.
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Therefore, the expert holds that a general liability insurance
policy should cover, and hence cannot exclude pollution damage
from its coverage.267 It is important to note that because general
liability insurance only covers accidents, it excludes gradual
pollution.
A second possibility is coverage under product liability
insurance.
Generally, a product liability policy does not
discriminate between environmental damage and other
damages.268 Many substances have the potential for far-reaching
environmental harm, such as those related to food or agricultural
products. Even gradual pollution could be covered under this
policy.269
The third option involves specific environmental insurance
policies, and as opposed to the first two options, does not focus
exclusively on environmental harm. These policies would cover
third-party liability, rather than harm to the insured site
itself.270 An environmental liability policy would likely cover
liability for damage from the premises itself, as well as operations
with defined extensions; this extends beyond the narrow coverage
for industrial accidents under more traditional general liability
insurance policies.271
267. Id.
268. Interview with Mr. Christian Lahnstein, supra note 264.
269. Id.
270. Specific environmental insurance is also broadly used in the United
States and Europe. See BIO INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, supra note 265, at 53-54; see
also, Dan R. Anderson, Development of Environmental Liability Risk
Management and Insurance in the United States: Lessons and Opportunities, 2
RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1, 11-14 (1998).
271. First-party insurance and liability insurance are two important types of
insurance. In the first-party insurance system, compensation is awarded
directly by the insurer to the victim. It is the victim who buys the insurance,
and the insurer pays as soon as damage occurs, making the damage the insured
risk. See Michael Faure & Veronique Bruggeman, Catastrophic Risks and Firstparty Insurance, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 11-14 (2008). Liability insurance (thirdparty insurance) covers claims of victims against injurers who are liable in
damages. See id. at 9. So the covered risk in liability insurance is the insured’s
liability for damage caused to other parties. See Gerhard Wagner, Tort Law and
Liability Insurance, in TORT, LAW AND ECONOMICS 377 (Michael Faure ed., 2009).
Direct insurance has some similarity to first-party insurance and liability
insurance. In a direct insurance policy, the potential injurer who possesses a
particular site additionally seeks insurance coverage for the benefit of thirdparties who could suffer damage resulting from that particular site. Unlike the
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B. Practice
a.

Insolvency Risk—Compulsory Insurance?

The first issue of importance is that experts report that, in
some cases, victims are unable to recover when the defendants
declared bankruptcy.272
In that event, the government
intervened and picked up the bill, thereby disincentivizing the
polluter from increasing its own costs by buying insurance
coverage.273 However, this may not be a problem in all pollution
cases. For example, an insolvency risk may not arise in the case
of large SOEs. It is also reported that because a stringent
liability rule is lacking,274 industry has no incentive to demand
liability insurance.275 To the extent that a judgment-proof
problem arises, compulsory insurance—or at least a requirement
of financial securities for selected industries that pose high
pollution risks—could solve this problem.276
There is some debate concerning the introduction of
compulsory insurance. At the policy level, the concern is that
policymakers are attempting to introduce compulsory insurance
while simultaneously forcing high-polluting industries to pay
pollution fees.277 Some experts propose to assess environmental
risks before the operation starts by using an environmental
impact assessment, and subsequently requiring the permitting of
polluters to include financial guarantees.278 In practice, some

pure first-party insurance funded by victims, in a direct insurance policy the
polluters pay for the premium. The difference between direct insurance and
liability insurance is that the trigger of coverage under direct insurance is the
materialization of the insured risk rather than liability. See FAURE & HARTLIEF,
supra note 257, at 220-21.
272. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
273. Id.
274. This is doubtful, since even before the entry into force of the TLL, many
specialized environmental laws contained strict liability. See supra part II.A.b.
However, it is probably not the lack of strict liability, but rather the low
likelihood of being found liable by a court, which reduced the liability risk.
275. Interview with MEP Rep., supra note 121.
276. Id.; Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30; Interview with Prof.
Wang Jin, supra note 89.
277. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
278. Id.
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industries with high environmental risks are also required to
seek insurance coverage in some local areas.279 However, some
argue that charging a pollution fee from industry, which needs to
be paid by permitted installations,280 and simultaneously
requiring the purchase of insurance, makes polluters pay twice.
It is suggested that part of the pollution fees paid by industry
should be used to purchase environmental liability insurance.281
Support for this proposition can be found in some local areas
where the government has provided subsidies to pay
environmental insurance premiums financed from the pollution
In other areas, the
fee charged from the enterprises.282
government links environmental insurance with other
environmental subsidies and green credit policies.283

279. For example, in Wuxi (a city in Jiangsu Province), some enterprises have
been obliged to buy environmental insurance since 2011, depending on its
location and type. See [Opinions on Implementation of Environmental Liability
Insurance in Wuxi] (promulgated by the Gov’t Office of Wuxi, Feb. 22, 2011)
[hereinafter Environmental Liability Insurance in Wuxi], available at
http://www.wuxi.gov.cn/zfxxgk/szfxxgkml/zcfg/szfbgswj/5967445.shtml (China).
A compulsory system was also adopted in Changsha and Guangxi. See [Rules on
the Management of Environmental Risk Enterprises] (promulgated by the
Changsha Envtl. Prot. Agency, Aug. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Changsha Rules],
available
at
http://www.changsha.gov.cn/xxgk/gfxwj/szfgzbm/shbj/201007/
t20100701_82840.html (China); [Opinions on the Implementation of
Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance] (promulgated by the Guangxi
Envtl. Prot. Bureau, Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.gxepb.gov.cn/
xxgkml/ztfl/hjglywxx/wrfz/201108/t20110823_6007.html (China).
280. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
281. Id.
282. In China, the polluters need to pay a pollution fee. Sometimes it is
argued that asking the polluters on the one hand to pay for a pollution fee, and
on the other hand to buy the environmental insurance, in fact makes them pay
twice. Thus, in some local areas, parts of the pollution fees are used to provide a
subsidy to the enterprises that buy environmental liability insurance. Wuxi
engages in this practice. See Environmental Liability Insurance in Wuxi, supra
note 279.
283. Sichuan is an example. According to a Sichuan Environmental Protection
Bureau document, the government, when deciding to offer subsidies on pollution
control, should give priority to companies who bought environmental liability
insurance. The attendance of environmental liability insurance is also a
criterion for examining green credit performance.
See [Opinion on the
Implementation of the Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Policy]
(promulgated by the Sichuan Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.schj.gov.cn/cs/zcfg/jjzc/201212/t20121221_11217.html (China).

43

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

2014]
b.

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COMPENSATION

269

Environmental Insurance in Practice

It is generally held that environmental insurance in China is
underdeveloped, due to polluters’ low liability risks and noncompulsory insurance options.284 The reasons for this have
already been mentioned repeatedly: (1) polluters largely can
count on the government to intervene in the restoration of
polluted sites; (2) liability risks are low; and (3) with the
exception of marine oil pollution—the purchase of insurance is
not compulsory; thus, industry has little demand to purchase
environmental insurance.285 Accordingly, an insurance market to
provide products covering environmental risks has barely been
developed in China. In practice, a variety of insurance products
that could cover environmental risks286 can indeed also be
observed. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of
these mechanisms.287
First, the main insurance product covering environmental
risks is the general liability insurance policy, which was extended
to cover pollution risks three to four years ago. However,
pollution is not clearly defined in the policy, and the scope may be
limited; there is usually a sublimit on the coverage for pollution
damage, and moreover, the general liability insurance only covers
accidents, and excludes gradual pollution.288
Second, Chinese insurers also started offering stand-alone
environmental liability insurance after 2007.
This type of
insurance mainly covers personal injury and property damage
caused by pollution, and does not cover specifically pure ecological
damage.289 The cleanup costs—excluding cleanup at polluters’
own sites—can be covered either directly under this policy290 or

284. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
285. See supra part II.B.a.
286. See infra part III.A.b.
287. Interview with Ms. Zhang Jing and Ms. Jean Wu, Munich Reinsurance
Company, in Beijing, China (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Beijing
Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps.] (on file with authors).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See CHINA CONTINENT PROP. & CASUALTY INS. CO., [ENVIRONMENTAL
POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE TERMS], available at http://www.iachina.cn:
8080/iaclause/clause/html/20091207041357078.html (China).
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via an added clause.291 However, usually cleanup costs are
covered only to the extent that the cleanup may prevent further
personal injury or property damage, and the cleanup costs to
protect the environment itself are not covered.292 The restoration
costs are usually also excluded.293
The insurance policy uses claims-made clauses, which is
customary in environmental liability coverage. Under a claimsmade policy, the claim for damages has to be received by the
insured or his insurer within the period of insurance coverage.294
The policy may also require that the incident leading to the
pollution have occurred within a certain retroactive period.295
This increases the predictability to the insurers. Some critics
argue that claims-made policies could dilute the deterrent
function of liability law.296 As far as premiums are concerned
insurers make a distinction between companies that constitute
high environmental risks and companies that do not. For highrisk companies, the insurer will usually appoint an expert to do a
risk assessment, with which the to-be-insured company normally
cooperates.297 For lower risk companies, the premium will be
based on a fixed premium rating table.298 The compensation rate

291. See [CHINA PACIFIC PROPERTY INSURANCE CO., LTD.，ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE, CLEAN UP COSTS CLAUSE [hereinafter CPIC CLEAN UP
COSTS CLAUSE], available at https://www.cpic.com.cn/cx/upload/Attach/
infordisclosure/50867389.pdf (China).
292. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
293. See CPIC CLEAN UP COSTS CLAUSE, supra note 291. A distinction is made
between cleanup costs and restoration costs. The costs of measures to cleanup
pollutants on insured sites are covered, while the costs of measures taken to
restore the environment to its initial status are not.
294. See Martin Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic
Environmental Risk, 55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 87 (1988) (explaining the claim-made
policy).
295. See China Pacific Property Insurance Co., Ltd. [ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE], art. 3, available at https://www.cpic.com.cn/cx/upload/Attach/
infordisclosure/50885015.pdf (China).
296. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cost Internalization, Insurance, and Toxic Tort
Compensation Funds, 2 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 123, 131 (1982).
297. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
298. Id.
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is still low, but experts believe that it could increase in the
future.299
A third type of policy is the pollution-site liability insurance
policy, a third-party insurance policy providing coverage for
damage to third parties, as well as remediation costs for polluted
sites.300 This type of policy is still quite rare in China, although
some companies, such as Huatai Insurance Company, provide
this insurance.301 An analysis of their policy conditions clarifies
the policy’s structure.
Two types of risk can be covered under Huatai Insurance
Company’s policy: (1) new pollution; and (2) pre-existing
pollution. The covered risk is defined as loss that “the insured is
legally liable to pay as a result of [c]laims, remediation costs, and
associated legal defense expenses” arising out of a “pollution
condition on, at, under or migrating from the covered
location(s).”302 This loss should be claimed or first discovered
during the policy period, and reported to the insurer during the
policy period or extended reporting period.
The difference
between new pollution and pre-existing pollution is that under
the title of “new pollution,” the pollution conditions should first
commence during the policy period; while under the title of “preexisting pollution,” the pollution conditions should be first
commenced prior to the inception date of the policy period.303
This provision uses the clause “the insured is legally liable to
pay,” showing that it is formally still liability insurance. The
term “claim” is defined broadly to include “government action(s),
suits or other actions alleging responsibility or liability on the
part of the insured for bodily injury, property damage, or

299. Id.
300. See Robert M. Horkovich et al., Site Pollution Liability Insurance, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE RECOVERY 506 (David L. Guevara &
Frank J. Deveau eds.) (2012); Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich
Reinsurance Reps., supra note 287.
301. See HUATAI INSURANCE COMPANY OF CHINA, LIMITED PREMISES POLLUTION
LIABILITY INSURANCE 4-14 (2008) [hereinafter HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE],
available
at
http://www.ehuataisz.com/uploadfile/200806/Premises%
20Pollution%20Liability%20Insurance.pdf.
302. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
303. HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE, supra note 301, at 4-5.
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remediation costs arising out of pollution conditions. . . .”304 In
other words, this policy covers both traditional third-party
liability and remediation costs on premises for which the insured
are legally liable to pay. Note that pure environmental damage is
also covered under this policy.305 The term “property damage” is
defined to include “natural resource damages,”306 which means
“damages for injury to or damage sustained by or destruction or
loss of fish[,] wildlife[,] biota[,] land[,] air[,] water[,]
groundwater[,] drinking water supplies[,] and other similar
resources belonging to[,] managed by[,] held in trust by[,]
appertaining to[,] or otherwise controlled by any government or
local government authority.”307 “Remediation costs” are defined
as “reasonable expenses incurred to investigate, quantify,
monitor, mitigate, abate, remove, dispose, treat, neutralize, or
immobilize pollution conditions to the extent required by
environmental law.”308 Thus, unlike the environmental liability
policies, by definition the coverage under premise pollution
liability insurance is much broader. However, since the clause
requires the costs to be what the insured is legally liable to pay,
the extent to which the broad provision under this policy will lead
to broad compensation will still depend on the liability provisions
and their explanations.
Huatai Insurance Company started to provide such a product
in 2008. However, three years after beginning to provide this
type of insurance, it was reported that the progress was still slow,
and the insured were mainly enterprises with foreign-related
issues.309
In addition to pollution-site liability insurance, there are
some other similar products with less extensive coverage. These
products cover cleanup costs on polluters’ own premises as added
clauses to environmental liability insurance policies. The added

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Xie Liu, [How to Promote Environmental Liability Insurance?], CHINA
INSURANCE NEWS NETWORK (June 8, 2011), http://www.sinoins.com/101288/
101475/59505.html (China).
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clauses provided by ChangAn Insurance310 and Ping An
Insurance311 are two examples of environmental third-party
liability insurance policies, which use an added clause to provide
coverage for cleanup costs on the insured’s land.
1. Product Liability Insurance
As discussed above, traditional product liability policies do
not exclude pollution and hence, in theory, provide broad
coverage.312 Of course the condition is that the environmental
damage must be linked to a product for which the insured is
liable. In that case, distinct from a general liability insurance
policy, gradual damage would be covered. However, in practice
there has so far been no case of a claim for environmental damage
under product liability coverage. This, therefore, remains a
largely theoretical possibility.313
2. Property Insurance
There is also general property damage insurance. This
covers first-party damage to the insured’s site. In principle,
pollution risks are also covered by such a property all-risk policy,
unless particular damage would be explicitly excluded.314 This
could be the case if the property damage to the insured’s site is
caused by gradual erosion or pollution (i.e., excluding sudden
pollution events and pollution events considered unforeseeable by
the insurer).315

310. See [Environmental Pollution Liability Insurance Terms for Workplace
Cleanup Costs], CHANGAN LIABILITY INS. CORP., http://www.iachina.cn:8080/
iaclause/clause/html/20091207035605187.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013)
(China).
311. See PING AN POLLUTION LIABILITY INSURANCE, [CLEANUP COSTS OF ONPREMISES
SITES],
available
at
http://property.pingan.com/upload/
20100701094634255.pdf (China).
312. See supra part III.A.
313. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
314. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
315. Id.
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This shows that there are quite a few possibilities to
purchase environmental insurance on the market, either
explicitly or implicitly, via general—liability or property—
insurance policies. However, it also shows that the number of
companies active in the environmental insurance market is
limited.316 For instance, China started experimenting in some
local areas to develop the environmental insurance market after
2007.317 It is reported that the revenue from environmental
liability insurance only accounted for 0.015% of the total liability
insurance revenue in these experimental areas in 2009.318 In
Shenzhen, one of the experimental areas, only eight enterprises
bought such insurance products in 2009.319 Professor Wang Jin
confirmed that only some larger insurance companies provided
explicit coverage for environmental damage, whereby the type of
coverage provided by the different companies is quite similar.320
There would only be a few differences as far as exclusions of
liability, scope of coverage or premiums are concerned.321
c. Difficulties and Limits
Experts, insurance, and reinsurance companies all mention
particular difficulties with the provision of environmental
insurance in China.322 This should not come as a surprise given
the relatively small number of insurance companies offering
those policies and the relatively small number of insured.
Insurers and reinsurers mention adverse selection as an

316. See [THE PATHWAY AND REGIME FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN CHINA] (2011) [hereinafter PATHWAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE], available at http://www.cdrf.org.cn/uploads/soft/PDF/
20120329/baogao99.pdf (China) (summarizing the companies that provide
environmental liability insurance up until 2009).
317. Id.
318. Lijing Liang Jialin, [The Ministry of Environmental Protection Tries to
Promote Compulsory Environmental Liability Insurance], SINA (July 9, 2012),
http://green.sina.com.cn/2012-07-09/103024739500.shtml (China).
319. Id.
320. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89.
321. Id.
322. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89; Interview with Beijing
Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note 287.
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important problem.323 Adverse selection is the phenomenon
caused by information asymmetry.324 Limited information on the
side of insurers makes insurance particularly attractive for highrisk companies, which could eventually endanger the insurability
of risks.325 In China, the problem could arise that mainly highrisk companies are interested in purchasing environmental
insurance.326 The insured on their side also report that the
amount of coverage would be too low, because insurance coverage
is often only provided for 1 to 2 million RMB, and only in
exceptional cases for 10 to 300 million RMB ($1.61 million to
$48.17 million).327 Those amounts may indeed be rather low by
international standards.328
Moreover, not only are there
complaints of low coverage, but premiums are also considered to
be high.329 The premium would be around 6% to 8% of the
insured amount.330 Compared to on average 0.3%, which in the
case of traditional liability insurance would be considered quite
high.331 Given the difficulty of predicting environmental risks,
insurers would likely, as the literature predicts, ask for an
additional risk premium to cope with their insurer ambiguity.332
But these high premiums may not generate any willingness to
pay on the side of firms.333

323. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
324. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490-91 (1970).
325. See generally Michael Faure, Is Risk Differentiation on European
Insurance Markets in Danger?, 14 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 83 (2007); R.
Guy Thomas, Some Novel Perspectives on Risk Classification, 32 GENEVA PAPERS
RISK & INS. – ISSUES & PRAC. 105 (2007).
326. Interview with Beijing Branch of Munich Reinsurance Reps., supra note
287.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Interview with Prof. Wang Canfa, supra note 30.
330. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89.
331. Id.
332. See generally Howard Kunreuther et al., Insurer Ambiguity and Market
Failure, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 71 (1993).
333. Interview with Professor Wang Jin, supra note 89.
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C. Summary
As far as the ability of environmental insurance to provide
adequate compensation for environmental harm in China is
concerned, the first and major problem is the lack of an adequate
institutional and statutory background for creating a market for
environmental insurance. In this respect, we not only refer to the
absence of an obligation to purchase liability insurance,334 but
also to the fact that most pollution risks are covered by the
government, and that the probability that polluters will face
environmental liability is generally low. This explains a low
demand for environmental insurance.
While on the one hand one may notice quite a few theoretical
possibilities for environmental insurance coverage in China, on
the other hand there are few insurance companies offering
environmental insurance, and also few companies interested in
purchasing it. Moreover, those who are interested are probably
the high-risk ones, thus creating a serious adverse selection
problem. Despite the fact that a few specific environmental
liability policies have been developed to cover environmental
risks, experts emphasize the possibility of using general liability
insurance and product liability policies to cover environmental
liability. General liability insurance and product liability policies
remain largely theoretical possibilities, since they are not usually
used in practice. General liability policies often exclude pollution
coverage; environment-related claims are rare in practice under
product liability policies. However, as discussed supra, it is not
always easy to differentiate environmental liability from other
liability covered under general liability policies or product
liability policies. Hence, the expert holds that those policies
should be developed to cover environmental liability in China as
well.
The only positive element one can mention is that
apparently the Chinese insurance and reinsurance markets have
developed a variety of environmental products that in principle
are able to cover environmental risks. Premiums today are still
relatively high, but increased possibilities of risk assessment may
reduce uncertainties and hence premiums. The crucial issue is
334. With the exception of the case of marine environmental pollution to be
discussed infra part IV.
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that an institutional environment should be created in which a
demand of environmental insurance can emerge. In that case,
China apparently has sufficient possibilities to offer the necessary
insurance coverage.
IV. COMPENSATION FOR VESSEL-INDUCED
MARINE OIL POLLUTION
As discussed earlier, marine oil pollution deserves a separate
discussion since it is one of the few instances where the liability
and compensation instruments for natural resources damage
seems to be working adequately. This may be explained by the
fact that some international conventions that China has joined
oblige Member States to introduce a financial security—like
compulsory insurance—for sea-going vessels to cover the risks of
marine pollution.335 Moreover, a long tradition of coverage via
the so-called protection and indemnity clubs for ships, to cover
environmental pollution risks, exists in the field of marine
pollution.336 The discussion on marine oil pollution in China will
follow the same structure as in the above sections. The legal
framework will be briefly presented, followed by the practice of
compensation for oil pollution in China.

335. William Tetley, Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law—The
Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to International Conventions—How to Adopt an
International Convention, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 775, 829-53 (2000) (appendix B of
international maritime conventions indicating whether China has signed on).
See infra part IV.A.a.
336. See generally T.G. Coghlin, Protection & Indemnity Clubs, LLOYD’S MAR.
& COM. L. Q. 403 (1984) (offering an introduction to protection and indemnity
clubs).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3

52

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

278

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

A. Theory
a.

Scope of Compensable Damage and Quantification
of Damage

The MEPL is the basic law in the field of marine
environmental protection and pollution prevention.337 Article 90
of the MEPL stipulates liability for marine pollution:
Whoever causes pollution damage to the marine environment
shall remove the pollution and compensate the losses; in case of
pollution damage to the marine environment resulting entirely
from the intentional act or fault of a third party, that third
[party] shall remove the pollution and be liable for the
compensation.338

In line with the EPL and the TLL, strict liability is
established under the MEPL. However, it does not further
explain what constitutes “pollution damage.” Because China is a
Member State of the 1992 Protocol,339 which amended the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage of 1969 (CLC),340 the definition of “pollution damage”
under the CLC also applies to China. However, in practice, there
are still debates on the applicable scope of the CLC. As discussed
in part IV.A.b, infra, the CLC applies to “any sea-going vessel and
seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for
the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo. . . .”341 The term “oil” is
defined as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude

337. WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A
COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, US AND CHINESE
COMPENSATION REGIME, 227-28 (2011).
338. MEPL, art. 90.
339. See generally Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Nov. 27, 1992. I.M.O., Misc 36
(1994), Cm 2657, RMC I, 7.51, II.7.51 [hereinafter CLC Protocol of 1992],
available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/protocivilpol1992.html.
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage is an
international convention on oil pollution liability established under the auspice
of the International Maritime Organization, amended in 1992.
340. See generally id.
341. Id., art. I, para. 1.
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oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil. . . .”342 Thus,
when the pollution involves other types of vessels or crafts, or the
damage is caused by non-persistent oil, the domestic Chinese law
applies. However, even when damage is caused by a ship and by
oil, which are in principle covered by the CLC, there are still
debates on whether the CLC applies only to ships with “foreign
related issues” or to all types of sea-going vessels and seaborne
How to interpret “foreign-related issues” is also
crafts.343
important in determining the application of the CLC.344
Concerning domestic law, the 2011 Explanation issued by the
Supreme People’s Court guides the judgment on vessel-induced
oil pollution.345 This explanation applies to “vessel-induced oil
pollution damage as involved in oil pollution incidents of vessels
that cause oil pollution damage or pose dangers of oil pollution
damage in the territory or any other territorial sea of the People’s
Republic of China.”346 The term “oil pollution damage” is
explained in a similar way to the CLC, which includes:
(1) Costs of preventive measures to prevent or minimize vesselinduced oil pollution damage, and further loss or damage
caused by preventive measures;
(2) Property damage caused outside the vessel carrying oil by the
vessel-induced oil pollution incident, and loss of earnings
caused therefrom;
342. Id., art. I, para. 5.
343. See generally James Hu & Yang Bo, Application of Law in Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Coastal Vessels in China, in PREVENTION
AND COMPENSATION OF MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
EUROPE, CHINA AND THE U.S. 193, 193-205 (Michael Faure & James Hu eds.,
2006); Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Financial Caps for Oil Pollution Damage:
China and the International Conventions, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE
U.S. 317, 329-30 (Michael G. Faure & James Hu eds., 2006).
344. For example, a foreign element may be: (1) one involved party is a
foreigner; (2) the cause of the case happens abroad; or (3) the subject matter is
located abroad. See Hu & Yang, supra note 343, at 198-99.
345. See generally [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues
Concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-Induced
Oil Pollution Damage] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s
Ct., May 4, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Explanation],
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=8822&
CGid=&EncodingName=big5 (China).
346. Id., art. 1.
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(3) Loss of earnings caused by environmental damage resulting
from oil pollution; and
(4) Costs of reasonable measures which have been taken or are
about to be taken to restore the contaminated
environment.347

Under this definition, two points are related to natural resources
damage: (1) prevention costs; and (2) restoration costs. To further
clarify the scope of compensable pure environmental damage
(ecological damage), the explanation stipulates that:
If a vessel-induced oil pollution incident causes environmental
damage, the compensation for environmental damage shall be
limited to expenses [for reasonable] measures which have been
taken or are about to be taken to restore the environment. Such
expenses include reasonable expenses on monitoring, assessment
and research.348

Similarly to the CLC, the Supreme People’s Court adopted a
cautious attitude to explain restoration costs; only the
“reasonable” measures that “have been taken or are about to be
taken” are considered compensable.349
When compensation for natural resources damage is
concerned, an unavoidable question arises of how to quantify such
damage.
As discussed earlier, there are general rules on
assessing natural resources damage in China. A non-binding
recommendation on assessment methods is published, which
gives guidance on quantification of five types of damage: (1)
personal injury; (2) property damage; (3) emergency response
costs; (4) investigation and assessment costs; and (5) restoration
costs.350 When restoration is possible, the restoration costs refer
to the actual costs that have taken place, while if restoration is
impossible, the recommendation advises the assessment of the
loss on the basis of a simulated restoration method, and/or other
suggested methods of calculation.351
In other words, the

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

2011 Explanation, supra note 345, art. 9.
Id., art. 17.
Id., art. 9, para. 4.
METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 92, § 3.2.
Id., § 4.5.

55

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

2014]

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COMPENSATION

281

recommendation goes further than the 2011 Explanation. The
latter allows compensation for restoration costs only when
restoration has been taken or is about to be taken. However,
under the recommendation, compensation is still possible, even if
restoration is not possible.352 In the field of water pollution, there
are two standards guiding the quantification of fishery losses: (1)
the 1996 Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses Caused by Water
Pollution Accidents;353 and (2) the 2008 Calculation Methods for
Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution Accidents.354 The
1996 rules apply both to the calculation of direct economic losses
suffered by individuals, and to natural fishery resources that are
not owned by private parties.355 The 2008 standards further
clarify the methods to assess natural fishery losses.356 These two
documents together provide a practical guidance in assessing one
type of natural resources damage—natural fishery losses. As for
other types of natural resources damage, the Technical
Guidelines for Ecological Damage Assessment on Marine Oil
Spills provide more detailed guidance.357
They allow
compensation for direct marine ecological losses, restoration costs
for the habitats and species, as well as for assessment costs.358
However, this is not a legally binding compensation standard, but
a sectoral standard, providing guidance on the assessment of
marine pollution damage.
As far as marine environmental liability is concerned, there
are several other issues worth discussing here. The above
discussion has shown that strict liability is established. The
352. METHODS ON ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, supra note 92, § 4.5.
353. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228.
354. [Calculation Methods for Economic Losses Caused by Fishery Pollution
Accidents] (promulgated by the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine and Standardization Administration, effective June
1, 2008, GB/T 21678-2008) [hereinafter 2008 Standard for Calculation Methods],
available
at
http://www.zjoaf.gov.cn/attaches/2008/11/24/
www092008112400005.doc (China).
355. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228.
356. See 2008 Standard for Calculation Methods, supra note 354.
357. [Technical Guidelines for Ecological Damage Assessment on Marine Oil
Spills] (issued by the Oceanic Agency, Apr. 9, 2007, effective May 1, 2007),
available at http://www.tsinfo.js.cn/inquiry/gbtdetails.aspx?A100=HY/T%200952007 (China).
358. Id. § 8.
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MEPL allows three types of defenses: (1) damage caused by war;
(2) “irresistible natural calamities”; and (3) “negligence or other
wrongful acts in the exercise of functions of competent
departments responsible for the maintenance of beacons or other
navigation aids.”359 The MEPL is silent on how to determine
liability if damage is caused by multiple tortfeasors. One new
characteristic of the TLL of 2009 is that multiple tortfeasors are
severally liable for the environmental damage they caused.360 In
line with this provision, Article 3 of the 2011 Explanation also
introduces several liability as the primary form of liability to deal
with the multiple tortfeasor issue:
When oil has escaped from two or more vessels, and pollution
damage results therefrom, if the party who suffers the damage
requests that the owners of all vessels involved undertake the
liability for compensation, the owners of all vessels involved shall
undertake their respective liability for compensation if the
damage is reasonably separable according to the quantity of oil
leaked, the harm caused by their oil and other relevant factors; if
the damage is not reasonably separable, the owners of all vessels
involved shall be jointly and severally liable, unless exonerated
by law.361

Both in the United States, as well as in the international
regime, liability for oil pollution is capped (with the exception of
offshore facilities and deep-water ports under the Oil Pollution
Act (OPA), liability for removal costs is unlimited).362 In China,
neither the TLL nor the MEPL establish a cap on liability. The
Commercial Maritime Code (CMC), by contrast, allows the liable
party to limit its maritime liability.363 It is worth noting that the
categories of claims that are subject to the CMC limit are much

359. MEPL, art. 92.
360. TLL, art. 67 (“Where the environmental pollution is caused by two or
more polluters, the seriousness of liability of each polluter shall be determined
according to the type of pollutant, volume of emission and other factors.”).
361. 2011 Explanation, supra note 345, art. 3.
362. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012).
363. [Commercial Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 7, 1992,
effective July 1, 1993), art. 207, para. 4 [hereinafter CMC] (China).

57

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

2014]

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE COMPENSATION

283

broader than the types of oil pollution under the MEPL.364 Since
China is a Member State of the CLC, which established a
separate limit for oil pollution liability, the limits set in the CMC
do not apply to claims for oil pollution under the CLC.365 As
discussed earlier, there are debates on the applicable scope of the
CLC in both academia and in case law.366 This debate also
puzzles the determination of the limit for oil pollution damage.
To clarify this issue, the Regulation on the Prevention and Control
of Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution of 2009
stipulates:
With regard to the limitation of liability for pollution damage
caused by vessels, the provisions of Maritime Code of the People’s
Republic of China in respect of the limitation of liability for

364. The limit under Article 27 of the CMC is established for:
(1) Claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or
damage to property including damage to [harbor] works, basins
and waterways and aids to navigation occurring on board or in
direct connection with the operation of the ship or with salvage
operations, as well as consequential damages resulting
therefrom;
(2) Claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in delivery in the
carriage of goods by sea or from delay in the arrival of
passengers or their luggage;
(3) Claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of
rights other than contractual rights occurring in direct
connection with the operation of the ship or salvage operations;
(4) Claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of
measures taken to avert or minimize loss for which the person
liable may limit his liability in accordance with the provisions of
this Chapter, and further loss caused by such measures.
Whatever way these claims are lodged, they may be entitled to limitation of
liability. However, with respect to the remuneration set out in paragraph 4, for
which the person liable pays as agreed upon in the contract, in relation to the
obligation for payment, the person liable may not invoke the provisions on
limitation of liability of this Article. CMC, art. 207.
365. See id., art. 208, para. 2.
366. See supra text accompanying note 343.
But see Zhang Liying,
Compensation for the Domestic Oil Pollution in China’s Coast: Which Law Shall
Apply?, in MARITIME POLLUTION LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, EUROPE AND THE
US 359, 359-69 (Michael G. Faure et al., eds., 2010) (discussing an alternative
interpretation of the application scope of the CLC in case law).
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maritime claims shall apply. However, with regard to the
limitation of liability for pollution damage caused by vessels
carrying persistent oil in bulk to sea areas under the jurisdiction
of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s
Republic of China shall apply. 367

According to this provision, the CLC will apply as long as vessels
carrying persistent oil cause the damage. It seems that the
“foreign-related issue” is no longer necessary for the application
of the CLC. If the damage is caused by an accident that does not
fall under the scope of the CLC, such as damage caused by nonpersistent fuel oil or fuel oil carried by vessels rather than by
tankers, then the limits under the CMC will apply. This concept
is also confirmed in the 2011 Explanation.368 In addition, the
2011 Explanation clarifies that the costs of preventive measures
are not subject to the CMC limitation if the damage is caused by
non-persistent fuel oil or fuel oil carried by vessels rather than oil
tankers.369
b.

Standing

To make a claim for natural resources damage, a major
obstacle in the Chinese legal system relates to the question of
who has the locus standi. According to the CPL, only the party
who has “a direct interest in the case” can bring a lawsuit to the
court.370 However, when there is only damage to natural
resources, especially public natural resources, that are not
privately owned, it remains difficult to determine who has the
standing to make a claim for the damage. This obstacle has

367. [Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and
Control of Vessel-Induced Marine Environment Pollution] (promulgated by the
Executive Meeting of the State Council on Sept. 2, 2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010),
art. 52 [hereinafter Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution], available at http://
dinrac.nowpap.org/documents/law/China/Regulations_on_Prevention_Control_of
_Vessel-induced_Marine_Environment_Pollution_ China.pdf (China).
368. 2011 explanation, supra note 345, art. 19.
369. Id. art. 20.
370. See supra part II.A.e.
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excluded much public interest litigation in China.371 However,
this is less of a problem for marine pollution. The MEPL
authorizes public authorities explicitly to bring claims for marine
pollution damage:
For damages to marine ecosystems, marine fishery resources and
marine protected areas which cause heavy losses to the State, the
department invested with power by the provisions of this law to
conduct marine environment supervision and administration
shall, on behalf of the State, put forward compensation demand
to those held responsible for the damages. 372

In China, many natural resources are owned by the State.373
This provision limits the competent public authorities who can
371. The claims for pollution of Songhua Jiang by PetroChina in 2005 provide
an example. See supra part II.B.c.
372. MEPL, art. 90.
373. Many natural resources in China are owned by the State or by the
citizens collectively. Article 81 of the GPCL states:
State-owned forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land,
beaches, water surfaces and other natural resources may be used
according to law by units under ownership by the whole people; or
they may also be lawfully assigned for use by units under collective
ownership. The State shall protect the usufruct of those resources,
and the usufructuary shall be obliged to manage, protect and
properly use them.
State-owned mineral resources may be mined according to law by
units under ownership by the whole people and units under
collective ownership; citizens may also lawfully mine such resources.
The State shall protect lawful mining rights.
The right of citizens and collectives to lawfully contract for the
management of forests, mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land,
beaches and water surfaces that are owned by collectives or owned
by the State but used by collectives shall be protected by law. The
rights and obligations of the two contracting parties shall be
stipulated in the contract in accordance with the law.
State-owned mineral resources and waters as well as forest land,
mountains, grasslands, unreclaimed land and beaches owned by the
State and those that are lawfully owned by collectives may not be
sold, leased, mortgaged or illegally transferred by any other means.
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make claims for compensation to “the department invested with
power by the provisions of this law to conduct marine
environment supervision and administration . . . .”374 According
to the MEPL, there are four types of public authorities involved:
(1) environmental protection agencies; (2) ocean agencies; (3)
maritime safety agencies; and (4) fishery administrations.375 The
environmental protection agencies are responsible for protecting
the ocean from land-based pollutants and coastal construction
projects; ocean agencies are responsible for the supervision and
administration of the marine environment, for preventing
pollution caused by marine construction projects and dumping of
wastes in the sea; maritime safety agencies are in charge of
marine environmental protection in the port waters, and the
investigation and handling of pollution accidents; the fishery
administrations are responsible for pollution inside the fishing
port waters, and protecting the ecological environment in fishing
zones.376 The latter three parties play a major role in bringing
suit for marine natural resources damage claims. When a vessel
accident leads to marine pollution, the Maritime Safety Agency
(MSA) “shall have the right to adopt forcible measures to avoid or
reduce pollution damage,”377 and is responsible for prevention
measures and cleanup in case of an accident, and can claim such
costs in court. In addition to such measures, if the accident leads
to other environmental losses, such as lost ecological capacity, the
ocean agency can bring a claim for the damage. The fishery
administration can bring claims for lost natural fishery resources.
c.

Mandatory Financial Security

As previously discussed, China is a Member State of the
CLC, which introduces an obligation for shipowners to seek
insurance coverage for the potential liability under the
convention.378 Influenced by the CLC, the 1999 revisions to the
MEPL require the establishment of vessel-induced oil pollution

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

MEPL, art. 90.
Id., art. 5.
MEPL, art. 5.
Id., art. 71.
See supra part IV.A.a.
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liability insurance for vessels, the creation of an oil pollution
compensation fund, and authorize the State Council to
promulgate concrete rules on those issues.379 However, such
concrete rules were only issued in 2009, through the Regulation
on Vessel-Induced Pollution.380 The regulation obliges vessels
navigating in the Chinese sea area—with the exception of vessels
of less than 1,000 tons by gross tonnage carrying cargoes other
than oil—to buy insurance or seek other financial security
coverage.381 The amount of financial security they seek may be
no less than the amount required under the CMC, and to which
other conventions China accedes.382 An additional document was
published in 2010 to further clarify and implement the types of
vessels subject to the compulsory financial security
requirement.383 The Implementation Rules also prescribe the
amount of mandatory coverage as follows:
Vessels with Persistent Oil
Cargo
Types of
Vessels
(gross
tonnage)
(1) Less
than 5,000
tons

(2) More

Amount of
Financial
Security
4.51 million
SDR384

(1) + 631

Vessels with Non-Persistent Oil
Cargo and Non-Oil Tankers
Larger than 1,000 tons by gross
tonnage
Types of
Amount of
Vessels (gross
Financial
tonnage)
Security
(1) 20 to 21 tons
(excluding 21)
(2) 21 to 300
tons
(excluding 300)
(3) 300 to 500

27,500 SDR
(1) + 500
SDR/ton
167,000 SDR

379. MEPL, art. 66.
380. See generally Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367.
381. Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367, art. 53.
382. Id.
383. See generally [Implementation Rules on Civil Liability Insurance for
Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage] (promulgated by the Ministry of Transp.
on Aug. 19, 2010, effective Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Implementation Rules],
available at faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/chn106766E.doc (China).
384. Special Drawing Right (SDR).
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SDR/ton;
but the
maximum
amount is
89.77
million SDR

tons
(4) 501 to
(3) + 167
30,000 tons
SDR/ton
(5) 30,001 to
(4) + 125
70,000 tons
SDR/ton
(6) More than
(5) + 83
70,001 tons
SDR/ton
Table 1: Types of vessels and required financial security.385

The Implementation Rules require Chinese vessels either to buy
insurance from the insurers determined by the MSA or to acquire
other financial security, such as a letter of guarantee and letter of
credit from insurers or other financial institutions determined by
the MSA.386 The requirements for determining the qualifications
of Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs and commercial
insurance companies are also clarified in the Implementation
Rules.387 In 2012, twenty-three insurance companies and P&I
Clubs were acknowledged by the MSA, including the China
Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association (CSMAA), commercial
insurers, and members of the International Group of Protection &
Indemnity Clubs (IG Group).388
d. Compensation Funds
Though China acceded to the CLC in 1980, it is not a
Member State of the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage (International Oil Pollution Compensation

385. Implementation Rules, supra note 383, art. 5, 6.
386. Implementation Rules, supra note 383, art. 8.
387. Id., art. 9, 10.
388. [Notice on the Lists of Insurance Companies Providing Oil Pollution
Damage Liability Insurance for Chinese Vessels of 2012] (issued by the China
Maritime Safety Admin., Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.tjmsa.gov.
cn/_data/2012/03/30/6d283d52_f876_4215_8c66_60eff2aa6ca9/ (China).
The
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG Group) is composed of thirteen principle
P&I Clubs, which provide liability coverage for appro imately 90% of the world’s
ocean-going tonnage. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF P&I CLUBS, http://www.igpandi.
org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2014).
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Fund or IOPCF) of 1971 and 1992.389 Therefore it is not
obligatory for the Chinese oil industry to contribute to the Oil
Pollution Fund.390 However, the Regulation on Vessel-Induced
Pollution requires the establishment of a domestic Vessel-induced
Oil Pollution Damage Compensation Fund (Compensation
Fund).391 According to the regulation, all “the cargo owners or
their agents who receive persistent oil cargo carried by sea within
sea areas [of China]” shall contribute to the Compensation
Fund.392 The concrete rule to manage the fund was recently
published.393
The Regulation on the Compensation Fund sets the
contribution at 0.3 RMB per ton of persistent oil.394 The fund can
be used to compensate or indemnify when: (1) the total amount of
compensation exceeds the shipowner’s limitation of liability; (2)
the legal defenses are available; (3) the shipowner and its
insurer/guarantor cannot provide full compensation; and (4) the
liable ships cannot be identified.395 Three exceptions are clarified
for when the Compensation Fund does not apply: (1) damage
caused by war, insurrections, or non-commercial vessels/military
ships held by the government; (2) claimants who cannot prove
that the oil pollution is caused by ships; or (3) damage that is

389. See I.M.O., STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN
RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS
SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS, 242, 274-81,
288-95
(2014),
available
at
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/
StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20%202014%20New%20Version.pdf.
390. According to Article 10 of the IOPCF, the contracting states must ensure
annual contributions to the Fund. I.O.P.C.F., LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR
OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, THE
1992 FUND CONVENTION AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 26 (2011 ed.)
available
at
http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/Text_of_
Conventions_e.pdf. China is not a party to this Convention; hence such
obligation does not exist.
391. Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution, supra note 367, art. 56.
392. Id.
393. [Management Regulation of Collection and Use of the Vessel-Induced
Pollution Damage Compensation Fund] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. &
the Ministry of Transp., May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Regulation on Compensation Fund], available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/201205/28/content_2147033.htm (China).
394. Id., art. 6.
395. Id., art. 15.
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fully or partially caused by the victims’ own fault.396 One major
difference between the Compensation Fund and the IOPCF is
that the former establishes a priority list to provide compensation
in case of insufficient capacity of the fund. For the claims caused
by different accidents, the Compensation Fund shall deal with
the compensation according to the time of application. If the
claims are caused by the same accident, then the compensation
shall be provided according to the following order: (1) emergency
response costs; (2) cleanup costs; (3) direct economic losses
suffered by the fishery and the tourism industry; (4) the costs of
measures to restore the marine ecosystem and natural fishery
resources; (5) monitoring costs incurred by the management
committee of the Compensation Funds; and (6) other costs
The upper limit of
approved by the State Council.397
compensation for one accident is set at 30 million RMB.398
B. Practice
a.

Claims Filing

Administrative agencies, especially the MSA, have an
important role in filing and handling claims. The MSA is in
charge of the response and cleanup of pollution from accidents.399
The State Oceanic Agency (SOA) is responsible for the restoration
of the environment.400 Most claims for ecological damage are
brought either by the MSA or by the SOA. Fishermen are usually
the victims who bring claims for individual losses. Most disputes
are settled before they can be brought to court.401
Different authorities have the competence for claiming
compensation in the case of marine oil pollution, and the division
of power between local authorities and the central government is

396. Id., art. 16.
397. Regulation on Compensation Fund, supra note 393, art. 17.
398. Id., art. 18.
399. Interview with Representatives of China Shipowners Mutual Assurance
Association, in Beijing, China (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with
CSMAA Reps.] (on file with authors).
400. Id.
401. Id.
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not always clear.402
Usually, in maritime environmental
litigation, the SOA brings claims for pure environmental damage,
whereas the MSA brings claims for cleanup costs and imposes
fines.403 Compensation for damage caused by the ship, Tasman
Sea, is an example of a case brought by the oceanic and fishery
agencies. This case was reported as the first case in China where
natural resource damage was compensated.404 In 2003, Tasman
Sea collided near Tianjin and leaked oil causing serious damage
to the fishing industry and the marine environment.405 The
Tianjin Oceanic Agency brought claims against the ship for the
loss of oceanic environmental capacity, loss of marine
biodiversity, restoration costs, and assessment costs, while the
Fishery Agency brought claims for natural fishery losses.406 In
the first judgment in 2004, the defendants were held to pay the
Oceanic Agency for the loss of environmental capacity and
assessment costs of more than 10 million RMB, and the
defendants had to pay the Fishery Agency more than 15 million
RMB for natural fishery losses.407 However, the division of
authority is not always clear. Sometimes the prosecutors,
environmental agencies, or local governments also bring claims
for ecological damage.408

402. See Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
403. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
404. See Ma Jing-jing & Du Jiang, Discussion on the National Claim System
for Oil Pollution Damage from Ships, in PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION OF
MARINE POLLUTION DAMAGE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE
US 223, 224, 231 (Michael G. Faure & James Hu eds., 2006); see also ZHU XIAO,
[A STUDY OF SOCIALIZED INDEMNIFICATION FOR ECOLOGICAL DAMAGE: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE] 28-30 (2007).
405. Xiaoqin Zhu & Lin Dong, Legal Remedies for Marine Ecological Damage
in China: As Illustrated by the Tasman Sea Oil Spills Case, 2 J.E. Asia & Int’l L.
391, 394-95 (2009) (noting that this case has been appealed by the defendant to
the High Court of Tianjin, and the final judgment has not been made public).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See infra part IV.B.d.
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Compensation Through P&I Clubs

Only certified insurers and P&I Clubs can provide insurance
coverage for oil pollution in China.409 CSMAA is one of the
largest insurance providers for oil pollution liability in China. A
P&I Club is composed of shipowners who enter into a risksharing agreement that mutually covers each other’s losses.410
CSMAA and other P&I Clubs formally function as a risk-sharing
agreement, and not as an insurer, because risks are mutually
shared and not shifted to a third party.411 However, from the
victim’s perspective, the crucial point is that P&I Clubs
compensate the losses for which the members—usually
shipowners—are covered.412 It is worth noting that CSMAA is
not a member of the IG Group.
Clause 12 of the Rules of CSMAA cover pollution risks.
According to this clause, the following risks are included:
A. Liability for loss, damage or contamination.
B. Any loss, damage or expense which the Member incurs, or for
which he is liable, as a party to any agreement approved by
the Directors, including the costs and expenses incurred by
the Member in performing his obligations under such
agreements.
C. The costs of any measures reasonably taken for the purpose of
avoiding or minimizing pollution or any resulting loss or
damage together with any liability for loss of or damage to
property caused by measures so taken.
D. The costs of any measures reasonabl[y] taken to prevent an
imminent danger of the discharge or escape from the entered
ship of oil or any substance which may cause pollution.
E. The costs of liabilities incurred as a result of compliance with
any order or direction given by any government or authority,
409. See supra part IV.A.c.
410. See T.G. Coghlin, Protection & Indemnity Clubs, LLOYD’S MAR. COMM.
L.Q. 404 (1984).
411. See FAURE & HARTLIEF, supra note 257, at 167-68 (discussing the
differences between risk sharing and insurance).
412. One important line of CSMAA’s policies is the liability insurance, which
covers damage to cargo, personal injury, and pollution damage. See Profile,
CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION, http://www.cpiweb.org/
xiehuijigou/en_aboutus.jsp (Jan. 11, 201 ) (discussing CSMAA’s member
coverage).
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for the purpose of preventing or reducing pollution or the risk
of pollution, provided always that:
a. such compliance is not a requirement for the normal
operation or salvage or repair of the entered ship; and
b. such costs or liabilities are not recoverable under the Hull
Policies or the Hull Certificates of the entered ship. 413

The rules of P&I Clubs usually do not contain a specific title
concerning restoration costs, because these are covered under the
title of cleanup costs. Cleanup costs need to be reasonable and
real. According to CSMAA, interim losses are difficult to be
evaluated, and are usually not compensated.414
CSMAA has an acceptance policy where a ship is inspected
before it will be covered.415 A classification society is designated
to undertake the inspection.416 When CSMAA believes that the
ship is not qualified, it can either ask for the improvement of
safety measures or refuse to cover the ship.417 Because insurance
coverage is mandatory, if the ship is refused coverage, the
shipowner will have to seek coverage from another P&I Club or
insurer.418 After the ship has been accepted, insurers perform
random inspections based on the presumed quality properties of
the ship and its age.419 The premiums charged for sea-going
ships and inland ships that remain in China do not vary
considerably.420 These differences are usually based on technical
differences between the ships and on the past loss experience.421
The ship’s premium will be increased in the case of a heavy claim
record.422 The evaluation of risks is based on the shipowner’s
entire fleet, rather than on the basis of an individual ship.423
413. By-laws & Rules: Section 12, CHINA SHIPOWNERS MUTUAL ASSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, http://www.cpiweb.org/en_baoxiantiaokuan/3.8.jsp (last visited
Jan. 11, 2014).
414. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
415. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
422. Id.
423. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss1/3

68

FAURE LIU - FINAL-NUMBERED

294

3/26/2014 11:16 AM

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Because CSMAA only provides coverage, reinsurance is
purchased annually from the international group of P&I Clubs for
any amount above the retention rate.424
c.

Remedies

In marine pollution cases, compensation is usually claimed
for the loss of fishery resources, with distinctions made between
the direct losses, involving the fish that immediately died as a
result of the pollution, middle losses, and long-term losses.425
Cleanup costs from removing oil are also claimed, and these
cleanup costs and losses by cleanup measures can usually be
easily calculated, because these costs are known.426 These costs
are easier to reclaim, because public authorities can use an arrest
of a vessel to cover the costs of cleanup and preventive
measures.427 Difficulties often arise concerning the acceptability
of the government’s proposed or executed restoration measures
concerning the evaluation of the damage.428
A regime of vessel pollution cleanup agreements is
established to ensure the timely cleanup of pollution. Some types
of vessels are required to sign cleanup agreements with qualified
institutions before they arrive at Chinese harbors.429 If the
vessels have an accident, these agreements require a vessel
pollution cleanup institution to provide response and cleanup

424. See generally Michael Faure & Roger Van Den Bergh, Competition on the
European Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law, 9
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 279 (2002) (discussing the function of the
international group of P&I Clubs).
425. Rules on Calculating Fishery Losses, supra note 228 (distinguishing
between direct economic losses and natural fishery losses, which are usually
called direct losses, and middle and long-term losses in practice).
426. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
427. See [Maritime Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 2 , 1999,
effective July 1, 2000), art. 21 (China).
428. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
429. See [Marine Pollution from Ships Environmental Emergency
Preparedness and Emergency Management Regulations (Draft)] (issued by the
Ministry of Transp., Sept. 13, 2010), art. 29-30, available at http://www.mot.gov.
cn/zizhan/siju/tifasi/lifaguanli/lifajihua/201009/t20100913_807321.html (China).
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services.430 Such cleanup institutions have to be certified by the
MSA.431
China’s experience with marine ecological damage claims is
growing.432 Sometimes public authorities will bring claims for
this damage.433 However, on the national level, regulation on
using the damages claimed from the polluters is lacking.
Recently, some local areas have started to publish regulations on
this issue, such as Guangdong Province’s Temporary Regulatory
Document on the Use of Money Compensated for the Oceanic and
The document applies to the
Fishery Environment.434
compensation awarded to oceanic and fisheries agencies for the
marine environmental damage and fishery losses in the
Guangdong Province.435 It held that the money should be put in
a specific financial account of the provincial or local treasury, and
should be used to compensate, monitor, and protect the marine
fishery resources, and to eventually remediate the marine
environment.436
d. Cases
In recent years, there has been an increase in cases involving
claims for marine (inland waters) ecological damage in China.437
This article uses sixty-six marine environmental pollution cases
adjudicated by the Guangzhou Maritime Court from 1991 to 2009
as an example to show how ecological damage can be

430. Id., art. 33.
431. Id., art. 27.
432. See supra part IV.B.a.
433. Id.
434. [Guangdong Temporary Regulatory Document on the Use of Money
Compensated for the Oceanic and Fishery Environment] (promulgated by the
Guangdong Dep’t of Fin., effective Oct. 2 , 2006), [hereinafter Guangdong
Temporary Regulatory Document] available at http://3y.uu456.com/bpdaaf3bc3sfbfc77da269b143-1.html (China).
435. Guangdong Temporary Regulatory Document, supra note 434, art. 2.
436. Id., art. 3-4.
437. See Li Zhiping et. al., [Water Pollution Public Interest Litigation in
Practice: Research Report on Relevant Cases in Guangzhou Maritime Court
(1991-2009)], 9 (1) U. SUN YAT-SEN L. REV. 239, 240-41 (2011) (China).
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compensated in China.438 In many of those cases, fishery
associations or local communities brought claims for their fishery
losses.439 There are also fourteen public interest litigation cases
where compensation was awarded for ecological damage.440
There are generally two types of plaintiffs in these cases: (1)
public authorities; and (2) procuratorates. Maritime safety
agencies and oceanic and fishery agencies are the most common
plaintiffs in the category of public authorities.441 Eight cases
involve oceanic and fishery agencies as plaintiffs and two cases
involve maritime safety agencies.442 Other authorities have also
been involved in cases, such as: (1) the environmental protection
bureaus (one case); (2) the environmental and health
management departments (one case); and (3) local government
(one case).443 Those cases show how judges deal with standing
issues for public interest litigation in the marine pollution area in
China.444 However, the actual number of pollution cases may be
substantially higher, because many cases are settled before being

438. This information is based on the Project, “Water Pollution Public Interest
Litigation” held jointly by Sun Yat-sen University Faculty of Law and the
Guangzhou Maritime Court. We are grateful to Professor Li Zhiping of Sun Yatsen University and to Ms. Yang of the Guangzhou Maritime Court for providing
the helpful information. It is worth noting that not all the tort cases adjudicated
in the Maritime Court are related to vessels. See Interview with Ms. Yang,
Judge, Guangzhou Maritime Court, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 12, 2011) (on
file with authors). According to a Supreme People’s Court judicial e planation,
the Maritime Court accepted not only cases concerning damage and pollution
caused by vessels, but also “[c]ases on disputes over claims for damages arising
out of shipping, production, operations on the sea or on water areas leading to
the sea. . . .” [Some Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Scope of
Cases to be Entertained by Maritime Courts] (promulgated by Judicial
Committee of the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 9, 2001) art. 1, para. , available at
http://www.gzhsfy.org/english/shownews.php?id=9772 (China). In addition to
vessel-related tort cases, the Guangzhou Maritime Court also accepts “cases on
disputes over claims for damage arising out of pollution on the sea or water
areas leading to the sea.” Id. at app. 3.
439. Li et. al., supra note 437, at 240-41.
440. Id.
441. Li et. al., supra note 437, at 240-41.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
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tried in court.445 Moreover, this sample only relates to the
Guangzhou Maritime Court located in the South of China.446
In the examined cases, compensation is awarded for different
types of pollution.
The fishery associations and local
communities are awarded damages that are calculated based on
the fishery losses they collectively suffered. The other cases deal
with public interest litigation where public authorities and
procuratorates bring claims for cleanup costs, natural fishery
losses, assessment costs, and at times, restoration costs.447
Several cases involved compensation for environmental damage
in addition to compensation for the above mentioned types of
losses.
Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate v.
Chenzhongming448 and Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate
v. Lu Pingzhang449 are two cases that involve claims for cleanup
costs and fishery losses, as well as ecological damage; however,
these two cases do not involve vessel-induced pollution. In both
cases, the defendants’ enterprise caused the water pollution, and
the environmental damage was assessed broadly based on the
assessment report.450
In Guangzhou Haizhu District
Procuratorate, direct economic losses were assessed, which
445. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399; Interview with
Representative of the Oceanic and Fisheries Administration of Guangdong
Province, in Guangzhou, China (Aug. 15, 2011) (on file with authors).
446. Id.
447. For example, in the case of the Zhuhai Environmental Protection Bureau
v. Taizhou Donghai Marine Transport Limited and China Vessels Fuel
Supplying Fujian Company (Fujian Company), one of the defendant’s vessels
had an accident leading to an oil spill and marine pollution in Zhuhai. The
Environmental Protection Bureau adopted both cleanup and restoration
measures, and it filed claims for both costs and assessment costs in the court.
In the judgment, Fujian Company was ordered to pay for all those costs.
[Zhuhai Envtl. Prot. Bureau v. Taizhou Donghai Marine Transp. Ltd. & China
Vessels Fuel Supplying Fujian Co.], Guanghaifashizi no. 88 (Guangzhou Mar.
Ct. 1999) (China) (on file with Guangzhou Maritime Court).
448. [Guangzhou
Haizhu
Dist.
Procuratorate
v.
Chenzhongming],
Guanghaifachuzi no. 382 (Guangzhou Mar. Ct. 2008) [hereinafter Guangzhou
Haizhu District Procuratorate] (China) (on file with Guangzhou Maritime
Court).
449. [Guangzhou
Panyu
Dist.
Procuratorate
v.
Lu
Pingzhang],
Guanghaifachuzi no. 247 (Guangzhou Mar. Ct. July 22, 2009) [hereinafter
Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate], available at http://www.gzhsfy.org/
showjudgement.php?id=4367 (China).
450. Id.; Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate, supra note 448.
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included monitoring costs, water resources fees, and cleanup
costs.451 In addition, indirect economic losses resulting from the
environmental damage were assessed.452 However, the court
held that these were too difficult to evaluate and could not be
compensated.453 The same issue arose for water treatment costs,
as they were considered too difficult to evaluate, and also were
not compensated.454 In Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate,
three kinds of losses were included under “environmental
damage.” These losses were: (1) direct damage (damage to
agriculture, fisheries, and ecology); (2) indirect damage (economic
losses of other productive and consumptive systems that were
caused by water pollution, and costs of preventive measures); and
(3) loss of enjoyment; however, compensation was only granted
for direct and indirect damage.455
The representatives from CSMAA held that oil pollution is an
important risk and leads to quite a few cases involving the
discharge of bulk and cargo oil.456 So far China has not suffered
from major vessel-induced pollution incidents of the magnitude of
Erika or Prestige.457 Since then, there have been many smaller
cases, none of which have exceeded the limit of the insurance
coverage.458
e. Challenges
Although the evaluation and compensation of marine
pollution damage is better than the evaluation and compensation
in land-based pollution cases, there are still problems in this
domain as well. Most of these problems relate to the evaluation
of environmental damage. The two cases examined above that
were heard in the Guangzhou Maritime Court, also show the
practical difficulties involved, as experts are unable to evaluate
451. Guangzhou Haizhu District Procuratorate, supra note 448.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. See Guangzhou Panyu District Procuratorate, supra note 449.
456. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
457. See Emma Daly, After Oil Spill, Spain and France Impose Strict Tanker
Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, A5.
458. Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
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the indirect economic losses or loss of enjoyment, and therefore,
these losses are neglected. These difficulties arise because there
is no standard for evaluating marine environmental damage, and
there is no consistent method for evaluating the damage.459 The
absence of evaluation methods leads to uncertainty, and the
potential for undercompensation.460
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Environmental damage is compensated in China by looking
at the theoretical compensation possibilities based on the statutes
and rules. Given the limits of the empirical method used, one
should be careful with drawing strong normative conclusions
based on this analysis. We realize that although some interviews
were conducted with representatives from government agencies,
academia, NGOs, and insurers, the number of interviews was
limited and most of them were concentrated in the Beijing and
Guangzhou areas. Moreover, we had no opportunity to talk to
“real” victims of pollution.461 Recent publications that were based
on interviews conducted with “real” victims demonstrate that
there is still a lot of work to do.462 In this section, a short
economic analysis of the compensation system, and policy
recommendations for future development are discussed.
A. Economic Analysis of the Chinese Compensation
System for Environmental Damage
a.

Liability Rules

Economic analysis shows that regulation and liability can be
used together to create efficient preventive incentives for

459. Interview with Prof. Wang Jin, supra note 89.
460. CSMAA Representatives held the opposite, believing overcompensation
may be the case. See Interview with CSMAA Reps., supra note 399.
461. Although we interviewed Professor Wang Canfa, who works at the Centre
for Legal Aid to Pollution Victims (CLAPV), and is knowledgeable about the
problems victims of environmental pollution in China are facing, we have not
interviewed pollution victims directly.
462. See, e.g., van Rooij, The Compensation Trap, supra note 148, at 740-41.
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potential polluters.
Regulation, liability rules, information
asymmetry between private parties and the regulatory authority
about risky activities, insolvency, availability of legal action, and
administrative costs are some factors that can deter people from
bringing a suit.463 This is also true in China. Although China
has made improvements in establishing its environmental legal
framework464 and strengthening enforcement,465 China is still
subject to huge enforcement challenges, because it still suffers
from weak agency capacity and capture-prone governance.466 In
this case, liability rules can be used to fill the regulation and
enforcement gaps.
General civil laws and specific environmental statutes work
together to create the legal basis for environmental liability. The
newly adopted TLL in China467 reiterated a few principles and
clarified some issues concerning environmental liability. A
comparatively comprehensive and sound liability system for
personal injury and property damage caused by the environment
has been established on paper. Liable parties are held strictly
liable, which in theory can lead to efficient care and activity
levels. A reversal of the burden of proof can relieve the victims of
the heavy burden to prove the causation between the pollution
and their damage. There is no provision channeling liability to
specific parties, and there are no general caps on liability.468
Although this seems in accord with economic theory,469 a review
of practical experiences has shown that the possibilities formal
legislation offers are insufficiently used. As noted supra, only a
small fraction of environmental disputes end up in court. The

463. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357, 359-64 (1984).
464. See Wang, supra note 111, at 202-03.
465. See Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law:
Regular Enforcement and Political Campaigns, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 57, 65-69
(2006).
466. Lesley K. McAllister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement
in Industrializing Countries, 32 L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2010).
467. See generally TLL.
468. No such provisions can be found in the TLL, GPCL or EPL.
469. See DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 181-85 (MICHAEL
FAURE ed., 2003) (describing an economics analysis of environmental liability).
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lack of environmental dispute litigation cannot be entirely
explained by the legal culture that people are reluctant to go to
court. Rather, the explanation lies in the barriers in access to the
courts that arise because the court is cautious to accept sensitive
or collective cases, and to reject a case where a written verdict
still exists, therefore leaving the victims’ rights unremedied.470
Even when a case reaches the court, the theoretical reversal of
the burden of proof is not always enforced in practice.471 Without
clear assessment standards and support from local government,
the victims are often haunted with the difficulties of proving their
damages, the pollution action, and causal links.472
Obstacles arise when trying to abate ecological damage, not
only in practice, but also on paper. First, Chinese law does not
impose an obligation on specific parties—polluters or specific
public authorities—to restore the damaged environment. Second,
with the exception of marine pollution, the law is also unclear on
whether ecological damage is compensable. Although general
environmental liability provisions can be found in the new TLL, it
does not explicitly reference pure ecological damage. Moreover,
hurdles are not only present in substantive law, but also arise in
procedural law. Ecological damage may be widespread, and may
not involve individual victims. Chinese law allows for very
limited public interest litigation, which poses a serious challenge
to the locus standi. Lack of assessment standards also makes
compensation for ecological damage difficult in practice.
These legislative gaps have led to insufficient restoration and
compensation. For example, there is an important governmental
role in the cleanup of polluted sites. This could be viewed
positively as the government taking responsibility for cleanup
actions.
However, this causes numerous difficulties.
One
problem is that actions are usually not directed against polluters.
Since historically pollution is often caused by SOEs, the
government’s incentive to act against polluters may be limited.
Moreover, the government will often provide restoration itself,

470. See supra part II.B.c.
471. Stern, supra note 154, at 85.
472. van Rooij, The People vs. Pollution, supra note 148, at 67-70.
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and simply charge a higher price for the new development of the
land.
This demonstrates the need for the Chinese government to
take on a different role in restoration cases. The Chinese
government should instead interweave public and private law,
and use legal and economic tools in conjunction with one another.
Since actions are usually addressed against new developers
rather than against polluters, it is doubtful that the actions
provide incentives to prevent potential polluters.473 Related to
this is the research referenced above474 discussing the
“compensation trap,” where victims are paid-off by industry,
subsequently removing the requirement to prevent pollution.475
This demonstrates that compensation is only one part of the
larger issue of environmental problems. Compensation should
not be a goal in and of itself, but rather it should provide
incentives to potential polluters to abate pollution to efficient
levels. Given the low probability of a liability suit and the
minimal damages that would be awarded, it is doubtful that
environmental liability in China can result in a deterrent effect,
notwithstanding the recent changes, inter alia as a result of the
TLL of 2009.
b.

Insurance

Theoretical analysis shows that compensation instruments
can complement liability rules in compensating and preventing
ecological damage.476 The compensation tools used include: (1)
insurance; (2) environmental funds; and (3) capital market
works.477 However, the comprehensive compensation system can
be called into question when liability rules fail to provide an
efficient deterrent effect. With the exception of marine oil
pollution caused by sea-going vessels, there is no general
requirement of financial security. The judgment-proof problem
473. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (describing the deterrent effect of tort law).
474. van Rooij, The Compensation Trap, supra note 148, at 741.
475. Id.
476. See generally Faure & Liu, supra note 14.
477. See generally PATHWAY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra
note 316.
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may leave the victims uncompensated, the damaged environment
unrestored, and may in fact encourage pollution.478 Low liability
deterrence coupled with a lack of a mandatory financial security
system leads to fewer compensation instruments in China.479
The environmental insurance market has only started to develop
in recent years. Now insurance possibilities, including general
liability insurance policies and specific environmental pollution
liability, are widely available. Personal injury and property
damage caused by environmental incidents are generally covered.
Cleanup costs may be also covered to the extent that they can
prevent further personal injury and property damage. Some
insurance policies480 even cover remediation costs on and from
the insured sites. However, gaps still exist as restoration costs
and cleanups are usually uncovered. Today serious challenges
facing insurers persist as premiums remain high and adverse
selection exists. The analysis, supra, shows that insurance is not
broadly used, which is not surprising since environmental
liability does not constitute a serious threat. As the seriousness
of environmental liability in China is not present, the incentives
for polluters to seek insurance coverage are not pressing.
However, if environmental liability were to develop further, the
insurance market would be able to provide at least basic coverage
for this environmental liability risk.
c.

Marine Oil Pollution

There is a more comprehensive legal framework in China for
ecological damage in marine oil pollution cases. The MEPL
allows competent public authorities to bring claims for marine
environmental damage. Legislation also admits that some parts
of ecological damage are compensable, such as prevention costs
and reasonable restoration costs. This focus can be explained by
the influence of international conventions, such as the CLC,

478. See Steven Shavell, The Judgment-Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 45, 54 (1986).
479. See generally Polborn, supra note 253 (describing the relationship
between mandatory insurance and the judgment-proof problem).
480. HUATAI PREMISES INSURANCE, supra note 301, at 4.
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which China has joined.481 Nevertheless, marine environmental
damage legislation also has inefficient features. The compensable
scope of ecological damage is similar to that under the CLC, but it
is much more limited than the definition of natural resources
damage in OPA, adopted in the United States. The United
States’ system compensates for the loss of ecological service
pending restoration, and compensates even when restoration is
impossible.482 Broader compensation is only feasible when clear
assessment rules are in place, which the Chinese system
currently lacks. The Chinese legislation itself does not explicitly
channel liability to shipowners. However, because it is usually
the shipowners who are held liable, any incentive for other
parties who may have contributed to the risk is diminished.483
The CMC created a limitation of liability, which is even lower
than the CLC limits, where a limitation established in the CMC
applies when an accident falls out of the CLC’s scope. This CLC
limitation of liability is also applicable in China. The capped
liability, combined with strict liability can provide insufficient
preventive incentives to shipowners.
The marine oil pollution compensation system has a more
developed insurance market. CSMAA has a long history of
481. I.M.O. supra note 389, at 242.
482. The OPA authorized the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) to promulgate regulations for the assessment of natural
resource damage in the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1). In 1996, NOAA
promulgated the final rule concerning natural resource damage assessments.
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 61 Fed. Reg. 440 (Jan. 5, 1996)
(codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990). This regulation prescribes a concrete procedure
and assessment method. Under the NOAA assessment rule, restoration is
defined as any action to “restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent
of” the damaged natural resources. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2013). To compensate for
interim losses, the NOAA rule also adopts a restoration-based approach:
compensatory restoration is allowed to compensate for the lost “natural
resources and services that occur from the date of the incident until recovery.”
Id.
When determining compensatory restoration, trustees should use a
resource-to-resource or service-to-service approach to compensate for the lost
natural resources service or value. If these approaches are not possible, trustees
can use other evaluation techniques to “estimate the dollar value of the lost
services and select the scale of the restoration action that has a cost equivalent
to the lost value.” Id. § 990.53(d)(3)(ii).
483. WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A
COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, US AND CHINESE
COMPENSATION REGIME 249 (Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2011).
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covering pollution damage to vessels, including preventive
measures and restoration costs. A mandatory insurance system
was adopted in the Regulation on Vessel-Induced Pollution in
2009, which can relieve the judgment-proof problem. This
Regulation also led to the establishment of an Oil Spill
Compensation Fund. All the cargo owners, or their agents, who
receive continuous oil cargo carried by sea within the sea areas of
China make contributions to the fund based on the amount of oil
they received (0.3 RMB per ton).484 The Fund compliments the
compensation capacity of the shipowners and their insurers.
However, basing the contribution only on the amount of oil, and
not on the actual oil pollution risks, has been criticized since it
cannot create sufficient preventive incentives for the oil
Economic analysis suggests the duty of
industry.485
compensation be placed on the actors that actually contribute to
the risks, and also that the contributions be in proportion to the
amount of risk they create.486 To base the contributions to the
Compensation Fund only on the amount of oil received
incentivizes the oil industry to change its activity level, but it
does not shift the oil industry’s safety level (i.e., choosing safer
vessels to transfer the oil cargo). One author proposed an oil fund
system in the United States that has achieved better risk
differentiation by basing a vessel’s initial contribution on the
historical oil spills it has created, and allowing a decrease in a
vessel’s contribution if better safety measures are adopted.487
However, such a system incurs high administrative costs.488 The
desirability of risk differentiation depends on the tradeoff
between the benefits in saving primary costs and the increase of
secondary and tertiary costs.

484. Regulation on Compensation Fund, supra note 393, art. 6.
485. WANG, supra note 337, at 338-41.
486. Id.
487. Lance D. Wood, An Integrated International and Domestic Approach to
Civil Liability for Vessel-Source Oil Pollution, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 47-48
(1975).
488. Id.
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B. Recommendations to Improve the Compensation
System
Important steps have been taken in recent years, both at the
legislative level and at the practical level, to improve the
compensation system for environmental damage in China. These
developments are undoubtedly important, but claims for
ecological damage in China still face substantial hurdles in
obtaining fair compensation. Therefore, environmental liability
in China is neither fulfilling its compensatory, nor its preventive
role. In this respect, China still has a long way to go. This
section attempts to provide some recommendations for the future
development of the compensation system in China.
a. Legal Framework
The analysis, supra, has shown legislative gaps that prevent
effective compensation for ecological damage in China. To this
end, economic analysis and international experience can provide
some hints to improve the Chinese legal framework.
Although a comparative comprehensive tort system for
traditional damage caused by the environment has been
established, legislation for ecological damage is not promising in
China, because China still has much left to do at the legislative
level. First, a clear obligation in response to an environmental
accident needs to be established. Either the polluters or the
public authorities should take cleanup/restoration measures in
the case of ecological damage. A clear division of authority is
necessary to ensure an effective and timely response. For
example, in the United States, various government authorities
are trustees of specific natural resources, and are required to
respond to pollution and bring claims for the damage.489
Authorizing the public agencies can also help to solve the
standing problem, which is an important hurdle currently facing
489. For example, in the United States, many federal public authorities,
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and
Interior, have been authorized to act as trustees for specific types of natural
resources damage. See VALERIE ANN LEE & P.J. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK: A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
157-67 (2002).
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the natural resources damage claim cases. The tendency to open
up space for public interest litigation will give the public
authorities or NGOs the possibility to bring claims for ecological
damage. Furthermore, an explicit definition of the compensable
ecological damage is also important, and this definition needs to
be accompanied by a feasible evaluation standard. Although
there have been a few cases where compensation for ecological
damage was awarded for marine oil pollution, judges still
struggle with how to quantify this damage. Without a clear
evaluation standard, compensation for ecological damage will
likely remain a solution only on paper.
The development of compensation instruments is still in its
early stages in China. Some possibilities started to emerge in the
insurance market in 2007, but it is reported that the coverage is
still low and the premiums are comparatively high.
The
development of environmental liability insurance is possible only
when there is a serious liability threat facing the potential
polluters. The prosperity of the insurance market can be
advanced with stronger policy support, including subsidies at an
early stage, linking insurance coverage with pollution fees, and a
green credit policy. Although China is not a member of the
IOPCF, it started to establish its own Compensation Fund in
2012. This began China’s attempt to use other compensation
instruments to cover ecological damage in addition to insurance.
Making contributions to the Compensation Fund risk related,
rather than just based on the amount of oil imported, will have a
stronger deterrent effect.490 Theoretical models show that in
cases of insolvency risks, compulsory financial security can create
more efficient incentives.491 However, while insurance and other
compensation instruments are still new in China, a general
compulsory financial security system may not be feasible.
Further development of the insurance market, and alternative
use of instruments, can help a progressive introduction of a
compulsory system.492
490. See WANG, supra note 337, at 338-43 (discussing risk differentiation in
compensation funds).
491. See generally Faure & Liu, supra note 14.
492. The progressive introduction of a compulsory system can either start from
specific geographical areas or certain industries. In some local areas, such as
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b. Practical Issues
Practical obstacles to the traditional environmental liability
rules prevent the rules from creating sufficient compensation or
efficient deterrence, and therefore deserve equal attention.
Theoretical models show that liability rules and
compensation instruments can complement regulation in
providing efficient deterrence.
Regulation, liability, and
compensation instruments for ecological damage compose an
interlinked system. Admittedly, environmental regulation is
subject to weak capacity and capture problems. However, to
expect the court system to fill this gap may not work out as well
as predicted by the theorists in China.493 To some extent, the
courts in China “are better conceived of as cost-benefit-weighing
government regulators rather than neutral arbiters.”494
Sometimes, judges still need to make policy considerations and
rely on support from the government. For instance, judges may
be reluctant to accept sensitive cases, to prove the existence of
harm, pollution, and causal links, and therefore, the victims need
support from local environmental agencies in the form of daily
monitoring data or on-site evaluation reports. The link between
the public and the tort system is more obvious in the realm of
ecological damage, because it is the public authority who
determines whether and how to restore the damaged
environment, and whether to start a claim procedure. Hence, the
improvement of the liability system also depends on
strengthening the regulation. Development of the insurance
market is a related issue, because without serious liability
threats, polluters lack incentives to buy liability insurance.
Policy supports, such as linking insurance with pollution fees or
other encouraging measures, can also promote the development of
insurance. Therefore, one cannot expect the liability rules and
compensation instruments alone to solve the problems created by
ecological damage. On the contrary, regulation, liability rules,

Changsha, the government already requires certain high-risk industries to seek
insurance coverage. See Changsha Rules, supra note 279, art. 4.
493. See McAllister, supra note 466, at 5-7.
494. McMullin, supra note 196, at 183.
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and compensation instruments need to be developed hand-inhand.
The Chinese regulatory system has grown in recent years, as
China has been trying to enhance its environmental enforcement.
Although not perfect, recent literature has highlighted a
convergence towards a more coercive and formal way of
enforcement.495 Moreover, although judges have incentives to
avoid political controversy, they do occasionally make innovations
at the margins by providing new interpretations or validating
new types of claims.496 The attempt to establish environmental
courts and allowing public interest litigation also constitute
additional steps towards compensation for ecological damage.
Although there is still a long way for China to go to reach a sound
compensation system for ecological damage, opportunities for
efforts and improvements are available at both the legislative and
the practice levels.

495. See generally Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial
Pollution Law, 32 L. & POL’Y 14 (2010).
496. Stern, supra note 154, at 91-93.
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